http://counterpunch.com/prashad02222011.html
Yet another revoltt against neoliberals, if not neoliberalism.
The main face of the neo-liberal agenda was Shokri Ghanem, who would be removed as Prime Minister of the cabinet in 2006 for the more important role as head of the National Oil Corporation. Ghanem aggressively pushed for foreign investment into the oil sector, and hastened to implement the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements with companies that ranged from Occidental Petroleum to China National Petroleum. Britain’s Tony Blair and France’s Sarkozy went to kiss Ghanem’s ring and pledge finance for oil concessions. It is the reason why the British government freed the alleged Lockerbie bomber and that Berlusconi bowed down before Omar al-Mukhtar’s son in 2008 and handed over $5 billion as an apology for Italian colonialism. In his characteristic bluntness, Berlusconi said that he apologized so that Italy would get “less illegal immigrants and more oil.”
Alongside Ghanem is Qaddafi’s son, Saif, who wrote a dissertation at the London School of Economics in September 2007 on “The Role of Civil Society in the Democratization of Global Decision Making: from “soft” power to collective decision making” (the work was advised remarkably by David Held). Saif argued for the need to give NGOs voting rights at the level of international decision making, where otherwise the United States and its Atlantic allies hold sway. The “essential nature” of NGOs, he argued, is to be “independent critics and advocates of the marginal and vulnerable.” To allow NGOs to temper the ambitions of the North is far more “realistic,” Saif argued, than to hope to transform international relations. That kind of realism led to his faith in the “reforms” and in his recent call for the harshest armed violence against the protests in Tripoli and Benghazi. “Civil Society,” in the language of neo-liberalism, is restricted to the work of establishment NGOs that are loath to revise settled power equations. The ragged on the streets are not part of the “civil society”; they are Unreason afoot.
Saturday, February 26, 2011
The tribes against the bunker : Pepe Escobar
The hard truth?
A huge graffiti in liberated Benghazi reads "No to the tribal system". That's wishful thinking.
Libya's is a tribal revolution. It was not, and it is not, being led by young urban intellectuals, like in Egypt, or by the working class (most of it in fact composed of foreign workers). Even though the actors of the anti-Muammar Gaddafi uprising may be a mix of ordinary Libyans, educated and/or unemployed youth, a section of the urban middle classes and defectors from the army and the security services, what trespasses all them is the tribe. Even the Internet, in the Libyan chapter of the great 2011 Arab revolt, has not been an absolutely decisive actor.
Libya is tribal from A to Z. There are 140 tribes (qabila), 30 of them key, one of them - Warfalla - boasting 1 million people (out of a population of 6.2 million). Often, they bear the names of the cities they come from. Colonel Gaddafi now says that the Libyan uprising is an al-Qaeda plot driven by hordes on milk and Nescafe spiked with hallucinogenic drugs. Reality is less lysergic; it's a concert of tribes that ultimately will bring down the African king of kings.
A huge graffiti in liberated Benghazi reads "No to the tribal system". That's wishful thinking. Libyan army officers are a collection of tribal notables seduced or bribed by Gaddafi, according to a strict divide and rule strategy, since the birth of the regime in 1969. In both Tunisia and Egypt the army was key in the fall of the dictator. In Libya, it's much more complicated. The army is not so important compared to paramilitary militias - private and mercenary - led by Gaddafi's sons and relatives.
Gaddafi and his "modernizer" son Saif have already played the only cards they have left, short of genocide; sedition (fitna) and Islamism, much in Hosni Mubarak-style, as in "either me or chaos". In the case of the Gaddafi clan, it goes like this: without me, it's either civil war - in fact fabricated by the regime itself - or Osama bin Laden (invoked as the deus ex machina by Gaddafi himself). Most tribes are not buying this "god out of the machine" ploy.
Gaddafi's prospects are grim. The Awlad Ali tribe, on the Egyptian border, is against him. Az Zawiyya has been against him since early this week. Az-Zintan, 150 kilometers southwest of Tripoli, revolves around the Warfalla; they are all against him. The Tarhun tribe - which, crucially, includes more than 30% of Tripoli's population - is against him. Sheikh Saif al-Nasr, former head of the Awlad Sulaiman tribe, went on al-Jazeera to call southern tribal youngsters to join the protesters. Even some people from his own, small tribe, Qadhadfa, are now against him.
Killing civil society
The tribe - with their clans and subdivisions - is the only institution that for centuries has regulated the society of those Arabs who have lived in the regions of the Italian colonizers, in the early 20th century, called Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan.
After Libya became independent in 1951, there were no political parties. During the monarchy, politics was all about tribes. But then Gaddafi's 1969 revolution reframed the political role of the tribes; they became just the guarantor of cultural and religious values. The ideology of Gaddafi's revolution revolved around socialism - with the people, theoretically, as the subject of history. Political parties were also discarded. Enter the popular committees and the popular congress. The old elite - tribal elders - was isolated.
But tribalism struck back. First because Gaddafi decided posts in the administration had to be distributed by tribal affiliation. And then, during the 1990s, Gaddafi renewed alliances with tribal leaders; he needed them "to get rid of mounting opposition and assorted traitors". Enter the "popular social commandos" - who fought corruption, solved local disputes and ended up enshrining the tribe as a political actor.
Gaddafi made sure he had an iron-clad alliance with the Warfalla. And by using a strategy centered in a slogan - "armed people" - he managed to tame the army. The key posts in the secret service were handed to his tribe - Qadhadfa - and one of his revolutionary companion's, the Maqariha. This essentially meant these two tribes monopolized all the key sectors of the economy, and eliminated - literally - any opposition.
The inevitable result of this tribal political system was the smashing of a civil society based on democratic institutions. The educated middle class was left with nothing. Then came the United Nations embargo - which lasted for a decade. The economy - already in bad shape - spiraled down; there was never any decent redistribution of the oil and gas wealth. Inflation and unemployment shot up. The rhetoric was always of "direct democracy"; the reality was the few "winners" were part of a reactionary state bourgeoisie, be they reformists, led by Saif; conservatives (faithful to Gaddafi's Green Book); or technocrats (those eyeing juicy deals with foreign corporations).
Year zero in Cyrenaica
No wonder the uprising started in Benghazi - which was kept out of any development strategy, in a region, Cyrenaica, with absolutely lousy infrastructure compared to Tripolitania.
Now the officially called Jamahiriya - the "state of the masses" - is about to collapse. It's year zero in Cyrenaica. It's impossible not to be reminded of the first days of "liberated" Iraq, in April 2003. The state has disappeared. Popular committees, Islamic groups and armed bands now control territory. No one knows how this will evolve. What may happen after the battle of Tripoli (assuming the opposition is able to get hold of some serious heavy weaponry)? A strong possibility is the emergence of self-governed, tribal-controlled territories, like in Afghanistan and Somalia; in fact whole regions seceding, although the exiled opposition is trying very hard to dispel these fears.
Before that, as Gaddafi has warned, there will be blood. The air force is directly controlled by the Gaddafi clan. Plus two of his sons are in key positions; Moutassim is the head of the National Security Council and Khamis is the commander of an armed forces brigade. The army has 150,000 soldiers. Top military commanders have everything to lose if they don't stick with Gaddafi. According to the best estimates, Gaddafi may still count on 10,000 soldiers. No to mention the paid-in-gold "back African" mercenary army, most of it inserted in Libya via Chad.
A huge graffiti in liberated Benghazi reads "No to the tribal system". That's wishful thinking.
Libya's is a tribal revolution. It was not, and it is not, being led by young urban intellectuals, like in Egypt, or by the working class (most of it in fact composed of foreign workers). Even though the actors of the anti-Muammar Gaddafi uprising may be a mix of ordinary Libyans, educated and/or unemployed youth, a section of the urban middle classes and defectors from the army and the security services, what trespasses all them is the tribe. Even the Internet, in the Libyan chapter of the great 2011 Arab revolt, has not been an absolutely decisive actor.
Libya is tribal from A to Z. There are 140 tribes (qabila), 30 of them key, one of them - Warfalla - boasting 1 million people (out of a population of 6.2 million). Often, they bear the names of the cities they come from. Colonel Gaddafi now says that the Libyan uprising is an al-Qaeda plot driven by hordes on milk and Nescafe spiked with hallucinogenic drugs. Reality is less lysergic; it's a concert of tribes that ultimately will bring down the African king of kings.
A huge graffiti in liberated Benghazi reads "No to the tribal system". That's wishful thinking. Libyan army officers are a collection of tribal notables seduced or bribed by Gaddafi, according to a strict divide and rule strategy, since the birth of the regime in 1969. In both Tunisia and Egypt the army was key in the fall of the dictator. In Libya, it's much more complicated. The army is not so important compared to paramilitary militias - private and mercenary - led by Gaddafi's sons and relatives.
Gaddafi and his "modernizer" son Saif have already played the only cards they have left, short of genocide; sedition (fitna) and Islamism, much in Hosni Mubarak-style, as in "either me or chaos". In the case of the Gaddafi clan, it goes like this: without me, it's either civil war - in fact fabricated by the regime itself - or Osama bin Laden (invoked as the deus ex machina by Gaddafi himself). Most tribes are not buying this "god out of the machine" ploy.
Gaddafi's prospects are grim. The Awlad Ali tribe, on the Egyptian border, is against him. Az Zawiyya has been against him since early this week. Az-Zintan, 150 kilometers southwest of Tripoli, revolves around the Warfalla; they are all against him. The Tarhun tribe - which, crucially, includes more than 30% of Tripoli's population - is against him. Sheikh Saif al-Nasr, former head of the Awlad Sulaiman tribe, went on al-Jazeera to call southern tribal youngsters to join the protesters. Even some people from his own, small tribe, Qadhadfa, are now against him.
Killing civil society
The tribe - with their clans and subdivisions - is the only institution that for centuries has regulated the society of those Arabs who have lived in the regions of the Italian colonizers, in the early 20th century, called Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan.
After Libya became independent in 1951, there were no political parties. During the monarchy, politics was all about tribes. But then Gaddafi's 1969 revolution reframed the political role of the tribes; they became just the guarantor of cultural and religious values. The ideology of Gaddafi's revolution revolved around socialism - with the people, theoretically, as the subject of history. Political parties were also discarded. Enter the popular committees and the popular congress. The old elite - tribal elders - was isolated.
But tribalism struck back. First because Gaddafi decided posts in the administration had to be distributed by tribal affiliation. And then, during the 1990s, Gaddafi renewed alliances with tribal leaders; he needed them "to get rid of mounting opposition and assorted traitors". Enter the "popular social commandos" - who fought corruption, solved local disputes and ended up enshrining the tribe as a political actor.
Gaddafi made sure he had an iron-clad alliance with the Warfalla. And by using a strategy centered in a slogan - "armed people" - he managed to tame the army. The key posts in the secret service were handed to his tribe - Qadhadfa - and one of his revolutionary companion's, the Maqariha. This essentially meant these two tribes monopolized all the key sectors of the economy, and eliminated - literally - any opposition.
The inevitable result of this tribal political system was the smashing of a civil society based on democratic institutions. The educated middle class was left with nothing. Then came the United Nations embargo - which lasted for a decade. The economy - already in bad shape - spiraled down; there was never any decent redistribution of the oil and gas wealth. Inflation and unemployment shot up. The rhetoric was always of "direct democracy"; the reality was the few "winners" were part of a reactionary state bourgeoisie, be they reformists, led by Saif; conservatives (faithful to Gaddafi's Green Book); or technocrats (those eyeing juicy deals with foreign corporations).
Year zero in Cyrenaica
No wonder the uprising started in Benghazi - which was kept out of any development strategy, in a region, Cyrenaica, with absolutely lousy infrastructure compared to Tripolitania.
Now the officially called Jamahiriya - the "state of the masses" - is about to collapse. It's year zero in Cyrenaica. It's impossible not to be reminded of the first days of "liberated" Iraq, in April 2003. The state has disappeared. Popular committees, Islamic groups and armed bands now control territory. No one knows how this will evolve. What may happen after the battle of Tripoli (assuming the opposition is able to get hold of some serious heavy weaponry)? A strong possibility is the emergence of self-governed, tribal-controlled territories, like in Afghanistan and Somalia; in fact whole regions seceding, although the exiled opposition is trying very hard to dispel these fears.
Before that, as Gaddafi has warned, there will be blood. The air force is directly controlled by the Gaddafi clan. Plus two of his sons are in key positions; Moutassim is the head of the National Security Council and Khamis is the commander of an armed forces brigade. The army has 150,000 soldiers. Top military commanders have everything to lose if they don't stick with Gaddafi. According to the best estimates, Gaddafi may still count on 10,000 soldiers. No to mention the paid-in-gold "back African" mercenary army, most of it inserted in Libya via Chad.
الفساد والاستبداد : مروان حبش
لقد عرفت منظمة الشفافية العالمية الفساد بأنه "استغلال السلطة من أجل المنفعة الخاصة "، وحسب هذا التعريف فإن الفاسد هو من يستغل سلطته عن وعي وقصد لكي يتوصل إلى مزية شخصية ، وإلى هدف غير شرعي أو هدف شرعي يمنع المتسلط صاحبه من الوصول إليه إلا إذا قدم "المعلوم".
إن الفساد في الدول التي ينتج شعبها سلطته الحاكمة ، أي الدول ذات النظام الديمقراطي، ظاهرة شاذة، وما أن يكشف مرتكبوها، حتى ينالون العقاب الذي يستحقون، أما الفساد في الدول ذات النظام الاستبدادي فإنه يكون ثالثة الأثافي التي يرتكز عليها النظام في استمراره في السلطة، ويصبح قيمة سائدة من بين القيم التي تحكم السلوك في علاقة المواطن بأجهزة السلطة ومؤسسات الدولة ، ولا غرابة في ذلك ، طالما أن الهمَّ الوحيد للحاكم هو استمراريته في السلطة، وهذا يتطلب الموالاة ، وأقرب طريق لتكوين موالين هو إغداق المال عليهم ولهم أن يحصلوا على الثروة بـ < شطارتهم > وبشطارتهم يسري الشر المستطير في أرض الوطن، من ناحية ، ويجب أن يصبح هؤلاء "مدانون" وبمقدار ما تكبر "ملفاتهم" يزداد ولاؤهم للحاكم، وفق منطوق الدولة الأمنية ، من الناحية الأخرى ، وخوفا من البطش يجد المواطن أن ليس في وسعه فعل شيء، ويلتزم الصمت الذي يرتفع جداره المحيط بالفساد ، رغم إدراكه " المواطن " بعدم اتخاذ أية إجراءات لاختراق هذا الجدار.
وبمقدار ما يعم وباء الفساد، أيضاً، تكثر التبريرات وتتكرر دائما : بأن اللجوء إلى الرشوة وإعطاء المتنفذين "بقشيشهم" أو "نصيبهم" أو "حصتهم" قد أصبح الآن تقليداً من تقاليد العالم الثالث، وأن بعض البلدان المصدرة تسانده إذْ جعلت مبالغ الرشوة المدفوعة قابلة للحسم الضريبي، وما هذا إلا عذر لتغطية حقيقة النوايا.
إذا كان الفساد في الدول الديمقراطية خاضعاً للمساءلة والمحاسبة، فهو ليس كذلك في الأنظمة الاستبدادية ، باستثناء حالة واحدة، وهي ضرورة تقديم كبش فداء بين فترة وأخرى، ويختار الحاكم هذه الضحية، وفق معاييره الخاصة ، وغير ذلك ، ينشأ عن الفساد في ظل هذه الأنظمة ظواهر خطيرة يدركها ويرددها جل المواطنين، من بينها:
نشوء شبكات المافيات وعصابات الإرهاب وكثرة القنوات المظلمة وزيادة التحرر من الملاحقة، ويصبح للمتمولين "القدامى والجدد" والمتنفذين وأقربائهم نفوذا حاسماً في الدولة، و يفلت هؤلاء الأثرياء من دفع الضرائب بعملية إفساد عام للإدارة ويصبح بإمكانهم "أي رجال جدار المال" التحكم في توجيه إصدار القرارات والقوانين التي تلبي مصالحهم، وتصبح الإدارة خاضعة لرغباتهم <بمؤسساتها القضائية والتشريعية والتنفيذية >، كما يمكن أن يتحكموا في الحصول على مناصب لهم أو لأعوانهم ، وبذلك يستمرون في الحصول على مكاسب ووسائل تضاف إلى وسائلهم المتنامية إلى حد مفرط ، ويمكن القول أن السلطة تصبح سلطة "أوليغارشية"، أي سلطة للأقلية الغنية التي تحافظ على امتيازاتها ضد كل شيء وضد الجميع.
ونتيجة تحويل مبالغ طائلة من المال إلى حسابات مصرفية لصالح أصحاب القول الفصل والحكم فيما يصلح أمور المجتمع وما يلحق به من ضرر، تُتخذ قرارات خاطئة تتصل بالسياسة والاقتصاد، تعوق البرامج والمجهودات التنموية وتجعل النجاح مستحيلاً أو مشوهاً وترتفع كلفة المشاريع بشكل باهظ.
إذا كان الفساد وانتشاره ينطلق من المقولة "أن السلطة مفسدة، والسلطة المطلقة مفسدة مطلقة" فإن اقتلاع الفساد "وهذه الجملة تصيب كبد الحقيقة"، ينطوي على مجازفات ويتطلب مصداقية ومواقف صارمة لا هوادة فيها ولا مراعاة ولا تواطؤ مع الحكام والطغاة من أرباب الثروة كمخرج من درك الأزمة العميقة أزمة نظام الفساد المستقر في أعماق النظام وأثاره التي أصبحت فوق الاحتمال .
إن محاربة الفساد ليست فكرة خيالية "دون كيخوتية" ، ولكن لا تقتلعه الأجهزة الأمنية أو بعض أجهزة الرقابة والتفتيش، وإذا كان استشراء هذا البلاء يقابله فقدان دولة القانون وحرية الرأي والصحافة والتعددية السياسية وجمعيات المجتمع المدني، فإن هذا كله يحتاج إلى خطة منهجية ويوجب الانطلاق من إستراتيجية عامة، تبدأ من تحويل بنية الدولة الاستبدادية إلى دولة حيادية ديمقراطية وسلطة متغيرة، وبهذا التحويل تصبح النظرة إلى الوطن وخيراته بأنها ملك لجميع المواطنين، و أن المال العام يجب أن يتوجه إلى تنمية الوطن ورفاهية المواطنين.
من هذه البداية يتأسس نظام وطني يجهد للمحافظة على الاستقامة، ومن أبرز ملامح هذا النظام الوطني : حكومات منتخبة ديمقراطياً، توزيع متكافئ للسلطات، صحافة حرة، انتخابات تمثيلية حرة، جمعيات مدنية لإيقاظ الوعي لدى عامة الناس ويفسح لها المجال للوصول إلى المعلومات الضرورية لمراقبة الفساد وفضح الفاسدين.
ونتيجة تحويل مبالغ طائلة من المال إلى حسابات مصرفية لصالح أصحاب القول الفصل والحكم فيما يصلح أمور المجتمع وما يلحق به من ضرر، تُتخذ قرارات خاطئة تتصل بالسياسة والاقتصاد، تعوق البرامج والمجهودات التنموية وتجعل النجاح مستحيلاً أو مشوهاً وترتفع كلفة المشاريع بشكل باهظ.
إذا كان الفساد وانتشاره ينطلق من المقولة "أن السلطة مفسدة، والسلطة المطلقة مفسدة مطلقة" فإن اقتلاع الفساد "وهذه الجملة تصيب كبد الحقيقة"، ينطوي على مجازفات ويتطلب مصداقية ومواقف صارمة لا هوادة فيها ولا مراعاة ولا تواطؤ مع الحكام والطغاة من أرباب الثروة كمخرج من درك الأزمة العميقة أزمة نظام الفساد المستقر في أعماق النظام وأثاره التي أصبحت فوق الاحتمال .
إن محاربة الفساد ليست فكرة خيالية "دون كيخوتية" ، ولكن لا تقتلعه الأجهزة الأمنية أو بعض أجهزة الرقابة والتفتيش، وإذا كان استشراء هذا البلاء يقابله فقدان دولة القانون وحرية الرأي والصحافة والتعددية السياسية وجمعيات المجتمع المدني، فإن هذا كله يحتاج إلى خطة منهجية ويوجب الانطلاق من إستراتيجية عامة، تبدأ من تحويل بنية الدولة الاستبدادية إلى دولة حيادية ديمقراطية وسلطة متغيرة، وبهذا التحويل تصبح النظرة إلى الوطن وخيراته بأنها ملك لجميع المواطنين، و أن المال العام يجب أن يتوجه إلى تنمية الوطن ورفاهية المواطنين.
من هذه البداية يتأسس نظام وطني يجهد للمحافظة على الاستقامة، ومن أبرز ملامح هذا النظام الوطني : حكومات منتخبة ديمقراطياً، توزيع متكافئ للسلطات، صحافة حرة، انتخابات تمثيلية حرة، جمعيات مدنية لإيقاظ الوعي لدى عامة الناس ويفسح لها المجال للوصول إلى المعلومات الضرورية لمراقبة الفساد وفضح الفاسدين.
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