وايكلف يغني للثورة المصرية
http://miltondassier.over-blog.com/article-wyclef-jean-chante-la-revolution-egyptienne-67024741.html
Monday, February 14, 2011
توجه آلاف اليمنيين في مسيرة إلى مبنى الأمن السياسي في العاصمة صنعاء
توجه آلاف اليمنيين في مسيرة إلى مبنى الأمن السياسي في العاصمة صنعاء للاحتجاج على الاعتقالات التي طالت الناشطين الحقوقيين والمتظاهرين المناوئين للرئيس اليمني علي عبدالله صالح مطالبين بتنحي الرئيس صالح.
توجه آلاف اليمنيين في مسيرة إلى مبنى الأمن السياسي في العاصمة صنعاء للاحتجاج على الاعتقالات التي طالت الناشطين الحقوقيين والمتظاهرين المناوئين للرئيس اليمني علي عبدالله صالح مطالبين بتنحي الرئيس صالح.
توجه آلاف اليمنيين في مسيرة إلى مبنى الأمن السياسي في العاصمة صنعاء للاحتجاج على الاعتقالات التي طالت الناشطين الحقوقيين والمتظاهرين المناوئين للرئيس اليمني علي عبدالله صالح مطالبين بتنحي الرئيس صالح.
Gravement malade, Moubarak est hopitalisé en Allemagne
مبارك يعد أيامه الاخيرة في مستشفى في المانيا وذلك بحسب جريدة الوسط البحرينية، التي ذكرت بان المصدر له علاقة وطيدة بالرئيس وعائلته،والذي اكد ان مبارك يعاني من استفحال مرض السرطان.
L’état de santé du président déchu Moubarak se serait fortement dégradé ces derniers jours. Selon le journal Al-Wasat, basé au Bahreïn, qui cite des sources proches du l’ex-raïs, Hosni Moubrak serait tombé dans le coma juste au moment de son départ forcé du Caire le 11 février pour se rendre à Charm El Cheikh, en mer rouge. Le quotidien égyptien Al-Masry Al-Youm a annoncé aujourd’hui que Moubarak se trouve actuellement à Baden, en Allemagne pour un traitement médical d’urgence.
Selon d’autres sources, Moubarak souffrirait d’un cancer de l’œsophage depuis des années
L’état de santé du président déchu Moubarak se serait fortement dégradé ces derniers jours. Selon le journal Al-Wasat, basé au Bahreïn, qui cite des sources proches du l’ex-raïs, Hosni Moubrak serait tombé dans le coma juste au moment de son départ forcé du Caire le 11 février pour se rendre à Charm El Cheikh, en mer rouge. Le quotidien égyptien Al-Masry Al-Youm a annoncé aujourd’hui que Moubarak se trouve actuellement à Baden, en Allemagne pour un traitement médical d’urgence.
Selon d’autres sources, Moubarak souffrirait d’un cancer de l’œsophage depuis des années
صحفيون مصريون يطالبون بإصلاحات جذرية في لوائح المهنة : علي عبد العال
دعا عدد من شباب الصحفيين في مصر إلى إجراء تعديلات عاجلة على التشريعات والقوانين التي تنظم العمل الصحفي، وخاصة ما يتعلق منها باللوائح التي تنظم إصدار الصحف والمطبوعات وضوابط الانضمام إلى نقابة الصحفيين.
وفي بيان لهم قال الصحفيون المنضوون تحت تجمع (صحفيون أحرار): "إن الثورة التي يحياها المصريون هذه الأيام من المهم أن تطال المجال الصحفي نظرًا لأهميته وحيويته ومدى تأثيره والدور الرقابي الذي يلعبه في المجتمع، فحرية الصحافة تساوي حق المجتمع في حرية التعبير والمعرفة".
ودعا "صحفيون أحرار" إلى وقفة احتجاجية أمام نقابة الصحفيين الخميس المقبل الساعة الرابعة عصراً، يتخللها الإعلان عن مطالبهم التي يأتي على رأسها: حرية إصدار الصحف، وتعديل لوائح عضوية النقابة بحيث تعتمد على قواعد مهنية لا سلطة رئيس التحرير، وانضمام الصحفيين العاملين في وسائل إلكترونية لعضوية النقابة.
وقالوا في بيان لهم: "لكم حاربنا كصحفيين شباب لتجاوز هذا الواقع المظلم، وظل بعضنا من الحاصلين على ماجستير ودكتوراه في الإعلام بلا كارنيه نقابة لأنه أبى أن يأخذ حقه بالرشوة، ورفع البعض الآخر قضايا منظورة أمام المحاكم منذ سنوات.. ونظمنا كثير من الفعاليات والتظاهرات.. والآن نعتقد أنه آن الأوان أن يستجاب لمطالبنا فوراً، بعد أن استردت مصر حريتها.. وهو ما يتطلب أن تستر صحافتها هذه الحرية".
Quand le monde Arabe Bouge, c’est l’Occident qui voit Rouge...: D.Benchenouf
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRapu7WqINk&feature=player_embedded#at=22
Algérie, c’est parti: La première manifestation contre le régime à a eu lieu à Ghardaïa
La révolution de Jasmin a culbuté ces idées toutes faites. Puisque non seulement les Tunisiens purent chasser, tout seuls, l’un des régimes les plus féroces du monde, mais ils allaient devenir un exemple à suivre, pour tous les peuples de la région.
En Algérie, Il ne serait venu à l’idée de personne que les Mozabites, musulmans Ibadites, réputés appartenir à une communauté très fermée, et particulièrement paisible, puisse entreprendre la moindre petite action contre le régime qui opprime tous les Algériens.
Et voilà que ce sont ces Mozabites qui, de tous les Algériens, sont les premiers à manifester contre le régime. Ah ! Ces idées reçues...
Grosse suprise, en réalité.
Pendant que le pouvoir magouillait des choses et d’autres, et qu’il mettait en place tout un dispositif pour contrecarrer toute manifestation à Alger, et dans les grandes villes algériennes, c’est dans le sud du pays, au Sahara, à Ghardaïa, plus précisément, que la première manifestation contre le régime a éclaté !
Et comme de bien ententu, les médias algériens, et particulièrement la Télévision, n’en ont soufflé mot. Idem pour la presse étrangère, dont les correspondaants à Alger étaient aux abonnés absents. Pas une seule ligne ! Ni la moindre allusion.
Pourtant, ce qui s’est passé à Ghardaïa est bel et bien une manifestation politique, avec banderolles et slogans. Et quels slogans ! Puisque les manifestants ne réclamaient pas moins que le ralliement de tout le peuple algérien, jusqu’à la chute totale du régime.
Cette marche,symbolique à plus d’un titre, aura été la première à avoir brisé cette lourde ambiance qui pèse sur tout le pays, pendant des semaines. Et elle sera certainement un signal, et un modèle, pour le reste du pays.
Un signal, parce que la chape de plomb a enfin été levée, que la peur a été exorcisée, et un modèle, parce que cette marche a été réellement exemplaire. A plus forte raison qu’elle a été entreprise par les citoyens du M’zab, dont le civisme, le pacifisme et la conscience politique sont autant de qualités typiques de cette région.
Parfaitement bien organisés, brandissant des banderoles qui appellent au changement, les manifestants ont clamé des slogans qui ne laissent aucune place à une quelconque ambiguïté : « Chaab yourid iskat ennidham »(Le peuple exige la chute du régime), « En nidhal, en nidhal, hata yeskout ennidham »(Militons, militons, jusqu’à la chute du régime).
Cette manifestation, qui s’est voulue résolument politique, s’est déroulée dans le calme. Aucune dégradation du mobilier urbain, ni la moindre violence n’ont été déplorées, contrairement aux émeutes quelques peu violentes qui ont lieu à Alger, il y a quelques semaines. Des manifestations qui ont vite tourné à la jacquerie, faute d’organisation. Mais aussi, il faut le dire, à cause d’agents provocateurs du DRS (Police politique du régime), dont le rôle a toujours été, à chaque manifestation de la rue, de pousser les jeunes émeutiers à la dévastation et au pillage. Une méthode éprouvée, par le régime, pour créer une peur panique au sein des populations, et s’ériger ainsi en sauveur de la paix civile.
Rien de tel, dans cette manifestation des habitants du M’Zab. Forte de centaines de manifestants, la marche s’est ébranlée depuis La Cour de justice de Justice jusqu’à la prison de la ville, et de celle-ci vers la Salle d’une Association, en traversant plusieurs artères de la ville. Les services de sécurité, venus en renfort, ne sont pas intervenus, et sont restés à distance.
Après la manifestation, des débats ont été organisés par les Docteurs Kamel Eddine Fekhar et Salah Eddine Sidhoum, tous deux défenseurs des Droits de l’Homme, autour de la situation en Algérie, et des actions qu’il sera nécessaire d’entreprendre afin de hâter un changement radical et pacifique du régime, pour l’avènement d’un Etat de Droit.
Bon augure pour l’Algérie où tout le monde est dans l’attente d’une explosion annoncée, et dont on dit déjà qu’elle ne s’apaisera qu’avec le départ de tout le régime. Mais où tout le monde craint que le régime ne parvienne, comme à l’accoutumée, à faire dégenerer le soulèvement populaire en chaos. Comme les régimes de Tunisie et d’Egypte ont tenté de la faire dans ces pays.
D.Benchenouf
Algérie, c’est parti: La première manifestation contre le régime à a eu lieu à Ghardaïa
La révolution de Jasmin a culbuté ces idées toutes faites. Puisque non seulement les Tunisiens purent chasser, tout seuls, l’un des régimes les plus féroces du monde, mais ils allaient devenir un exemple à suivre, pour tous les peuples de la région.
En Algérie, Il ne serait venu à l’idée de personne que les Mozabites, musulmans Ibadites, réputés appartenir à une communauté très fermée, et particulièrement paisible, puisse entreprendre la moindre petite action contre le régime qui opprime tous les Algériens.
Et voilà que ce sont ces Mozabites qui, de tous les Algériens, sont les premiers à manifester contre le régime. Ah ! Ces idées reçues...
Grosse suprise, en réalité.
Pendant que le pouvoir magouillait des choses et d’autres, et qu’il mettait en place tout un dispositif pour contrecarrer toute manifestation à Alger, et dans les grandes villes algériennes, c’est dans le sud du pays, au Sahara, à Ghardaïa, plus précisément, que la première manifestation contre le régime a éclaté !
Et comme de bien ententu, les médias algériens, et particulièrement la Télévision, n’en ont soufflé mot. Idem pour la presse étrangère, dont les correspondaants à Alger étaient aux abonnés absents. Pas une seule ligne ! Ni la moindre allusion.
Pourtant, ce qui s’est passé à Ghardaïa est bel et bien une manifestation politique, avec banderolles et slogans. Et quels slogans ! Puisque les manifestants ne réclamaient pas moins que le ralliement de tout le peuple algérien, jusqu’à la chute totale du régime.
Cette marche,symbolique à plus d’un titre, aura été la première à avoir brisé cette lourde ambiance qui pèse sur tout le pays, pendant des semaines. Et elle sera certainement un signal, et un modèle, pour le reste du pays.
Un signal, parce que la chape de plomb a enfin été levée, que la peur a été exorcisée, et un modèle, parce que cette marche a été réellement exemplaire. A plus forte raison qu’elle a été entreprise par les citoyens du M’zab, dont le civisme, le pacifisme et la conscience politique sont autant de qualités typiques de cette région.
Parfaitement bien organisés, brandissant des banderoles qui appellent au changement, les manifestants ont clamé des slogans qui ne laissent aucune place à une quelconque ambiguïté : « Chaab yourid iskat ennidham »(Le peuple exige la chute du régime), « En nidhal, en nidhal, hata yeskout ennidham »(Militons, militons, jusqu’à la chute du régime).
Cette manifestation, qui s’est voulue résolument politique, s’est déroulée dans le calme. Aucune dégradation du mobilier urbain, ni la moindre violence n’ont été déplorées, contrairement aux émeutes quelques peu violentes qui ont lieu à Alger, il y a quelques semaines. Des manifestations qui ont vite tourné à la jacquerie, faute d’organisation. Mais aussi, il faut le dire, à cause d’agents provocateurs du DRS (Police politique du régime), dont le rôle a toujours été, à chaque manifestation de la rue, de pousser les jeunes émeutiers à la dévastation et au pillage. Une méthode éprouvée, par le régime, pour créer une peur panique au sein des populations, et s’ériger ainsi en sauveur de la paix civile.
Rien de tel, dans cette manifestation des habitants du M’Zab. Forte de centaines de manifestants, la marche s’est ébranlée depuis La Cour de justice de Justice jusqu’à la prison de la ville, et de celle-ci vers la Salle d’une Association, en traversant plusieurs artères de la ville. Les services de sécurité, venus en renfort, ne sont pas intervenus, et sont restés à distance.
Après la manifestation, des débats ont été organisés par les Docteurs Kamel Eddine Fekhar et Salah Eddine Sidhoum, tous deux défenseurs des Droits de l’Homme, autour de la situation en Algérie, et des actions qu’il sera nécessaire d’entreprendre afin de hâter un changement radical et pacifique du régime, pour l’avènement d’un Etat de Droit.
Bon augure pour l’Algérie où tout le monde est dans l’attente d’une explosion annoncée, et dont on dit déjà qu’elle ne s’apaisera qu’avec le départ de tout le régime. Mais où tout le monde craint que le régime ne parvienne, comme à l’accoutumée, à faire dégenerer le soulèvement populaire en chaos. Comme les régimes de Tunisie et d’Egypte ont tenté de la faire dans ces pays.
D.Benchenouf
Helicopters circled over the capital Manama: Al Jazera
Protesters had called for a Day of Rage to be observed on Monday, inspired by anti-government uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia.
Helicopters circled over the capital Manama, where protesters were expected to gather in the afternoon, and there was greater police presence in Shia villages.
At least 14 people were injured in clashes overnight and on Monday, news agencies reported.
The reports said police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse marchers in the mostly Shia village of Newidrat in the southwest region of the island kingdom - a key Western ally. The marchers were demanding the release of those detained during earlier protests.
Nabeel Rajab of the Bahrain Centre for human rights told Al Jazeera: "We are only asking for political reforms, right of political participation, respect for human rights, stopping of systematic discrimination against Shias.
"All the demands are to do with human rights and nothing to do with the ruling family and their regime."
However, he warned that if the government resorted to violence then the people might be forced to even demand for a regime change.
"We call on all Bahraini people - men, women, boys and girls - to share in our rallies in a peaceful and civilised way to guarantee a stable and promising future for ourselves and our children," activists said in a statement issued on Twitter.
Marginalised Shias
The Bahraini ruling family had offered cash payouts in the run-up to the protest to prevent Shia discontent from bubbling over as popular revolts spread in the Arab world.
Diplomats say Bahrain's demonstrations, organised on the social media websites Facebook and Twitter, will be a gauge of whether a larger base of Shias can be drawn on to the streets. The big test will be if demonstrations take hold in Manama, where demonstrations are rare.
Shias account for 70 per cent of the population but they allege discrimination at the hands of Bahrain’s Sunni rulers.
Big protests in the Gulf Arab island state could embolden other marginalised Shias in nearby Saudi Arabia, political analysts say.
Helicopters circled over the capital Manama, where protesters were expected to gather in the afternoon, and there was greater police presence in Shia villages.
At least 14 people were injured in clashes overnight and on Monday, news agencies reported.
The reports said police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse marchers in the mostly Shia village of Newidrat in the southwest region of the island kingdom - a key Western ally. The marchers were demanding the release of those detained during earlier protests.
Nabeel Rajab of the Bahrain Centre for human rights told Al Jazeera: "We are only asking for political reforms, right of political participation, respect for human rights, stopping of systematic discrimination against Shias.
"All the demands are to do with human rights and nothing to do with the ruling family and their regime."
However, he warned that if the government resorted to violence then the people might be forced to even demand for a regime change.
"We call on all Bahraini people - men, women, boys and girls - to share in our rallies in a peaceful and civilised way to guarantee a stable and promising future for ourselves and our children," activists said in a statement issued on Twitter.
Marginalised Shias
The Bahraini ruling family had offered cash payouts in the run-up to the protest to prevent Shia discontent from bubbling over as popular revolts spread in the Arab world.
Diplomats say Bahrain's demonstrations, organised on the social media websites Facebook and Twitter, will be a gauge of whether a larger base of Shias can be drawn on to the streets. The big test will be if demonstrations take hold in Manama, where demonstrations are rare.
Shias account for 70 per cent of the population but they allege discrimination at the hands of Bahrain’s Sunni rulers.
Big protests in the Gulf Arab island state could embolden other marginalised Shias in nearby Saudi Arabia, political analysts say.
Plusieurs centaines de ces Tunisiens ont déjà quitté Lampedusa : AFP
LAMPEDUSA — "Il n'y a rien pour moi en Tunisie. La révolution n'a rien changé". Comme des milliers de Tunisiens arrivés sur la petite île italienne de Lampedusa, Sami Jassoussi est exténué, mais heureux, et rêve d'une nouvelle vie en Europe.
"La police nous frappait comme avant et l'économie est mal en point. Je pense que les choses seront mieux ici en Europe", déclare ce chauffeur routier de 31 ans, venu du port de Zarzis (sud de la Tunisie).
Comme lui, des centaines de Tunisiens vêtus de sweats à capuche, de vestes en cuir ou d'habits traditionnels, errent dans les rues de Lampedusa, minuscule île italienne située au sud de la Sicile et à 138 km des côtes tunisiennes, devenue leur porte d'entrée en Europe.
Ils expliquent comment ils ont entrepris vendredi un voyage risqué et coûteux en bateau pour fuir la misère et la répression policière un mois après la chute du régime de Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.
En cinq jours, quelque 5.000 clandestins, pour la plupart tunisiens, sont arrivés à Lampedusa. Un débarquement massif difficile à gérer qui suscite la vive inquiétude de Rome. L'Italie a demandé à l'Union européenne de l'aider à affronter cette "crise humanitaire".
Selon l'Organisation internationale des migrations à Genève, il n'y a pas eu d'arrivages de clandestins à Lampedusa dans la nuit et jusqu'en milieu d'après-midi lundi.
Lundi, l'armée tunisienne patrouillait dans les rues de Zarzis, d'où sont partis clandestinement des centaines de jeunes Tunisiens, pour tenter d'enrayer le flux des départs.
"J'avais une entreprise de construction là-bas mais il n'y avait pas de travail. J'ai donc dû laisser partir tous mes employés et je suis venu ici", raconte Audi, âgé de 40 ans et originaire de l'île touristique de Djerba, dans le sud du pays.
"Allez en Italie, laissez tomber la Tunisie", lance en passant un groupe de jeunes sur le chemin du centre d'accueil, où sont hébergés plus de 2.000 arrivants, après être allés acheter de la nourriture en ville.
Agé de 20 ans, Ayoub, raconte que son père a dû s'endetter pour verser 1.000 euros à des passeurs afin qu'il puisse quitter le pays. "Je travaillais dans un hôtel de Djerba mais tous les touristes sont partis à cause de la révolution (du jasmin, ndlr). Je veux juste un travail ici. Peut-être que j'en trouverai un en France", dit-il.
Nizar Ben Ammar, 30 ans, qui travaillait aussi dans un hôtel, montre des cicatrices sur ses mains, affirmant qu'il a été brutalisé par la police, ce qui l'a obligé à s'enfuir de Tunisie. "La révolution n'est pas finie. S'ils nous renvoient là-bas, ce sera le chaos", craint-il.
آلاف من الشباب التونسيون يلجئون الى ايطالي طلبا للعيش الرغد كما حلموا في شوارع تونس التي جثم عليها بن علي،
Depuis leurs balcons et leurs fenêtres, les habitants de Lampedusa, qui compte environ 6.000 âmes, observent les arrivants.
"Nous faisons en sorte qu'ils restent calmes afin d'éviter les tensions avec la population locale", indique un officier de police sous couvert de l'anonymat. "La situation est assez chaotique", ajoute-t-il.
Plusieurs centaines de ces Tunisiens ont déjà quitté Lampedusa en avion ou en bateau à destination de centres de rétention situés ailleurs en Italie pour faire des démarches administratives, notamment pour demander l'asile.
"Nous avons toujours accueilli les Européens en Tunisie. Maintenant, nous demandons aux Européens de nous aider", implore Nizar Ben Ammar.
اعتصامات في البحرين ، هل هي بداية نهاية العرش؟
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R3LazFJ0wa4
&feature=youtu.be
There were many demonstrators in a number of villages like Bani-Jamra, Diraz, Karanna, Shakhura, Mugsha, Daih, Sannabis, Jidhafs, Bilad Alqadeem, Sitra, Maameer, Ekr, Nuwaidrat, Hamala, Karzakan and Almalikkiya. In addition to gatherings near Bahrain Mall, Dana Mall and others. ( Started from 2:00 PM , 14 FEB , 2011)
The riot police used tear gas and rubber bullets against the protesters in all the mentioned areas.
Every time the demonstrators regrouped they were attacked again with rubber bullets and tear gas.
The Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights has documented more than 20 cases in the hospital as a result of the use of force by the riot police.
The demonstrators were peaceful and were carrying the Bahraini flag.
Riot police attacking a peaceful demonstration in Diraz Village:
Egypt's thirst for freedom has intensified, even after Mubarak's exit : Amira Hass
Prior to Mubarak's fall, demonstrators in Tahrir Square shouted "The army and the people - one hand." After the man who ruled for the past 30 years was toppled, those who listened closely noticed that the chant had changed slightly: "The people and the army - one hand."
Was someone behind this change? Did it evolve on its own, unintentionally? Was this a signal that the people - that hidden entity, which grew and developed into such a visible, vibrant creature in three weeks - are warning the army not to forget who is sovereign? Or perhaps those who listen carefully are attributing too much meaning to the change in words?
There is no answer, but the fact that the question is being asked just goes to show how proud the people are that their revolution was guided by some sort of internal logic, a collective logic, with a great deal of dialogue and listening. Not by orders, not by dictates from above. For example, without any directives, it became clear that attention should not be diverted from the main issue: the oppressive regime. There was no other issue, not the United States or Israel, not different economic visions or other problems, and certainly not the disagreements between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular population. Each in its own time.
The "regular" protesters allowed themselves a break on Sunday, staying in bed a little longer and keeping away from the square. It and its access roads reverted to being used for vehicular traffic.
But the magic is not over: Not only this writer - three hours into her visit to revolutionary Cairo - but also a resident of the capital noticed as well that drivers are honking less. Only at a specific location were drivers asked to honk, for some unclear reason. And they eagerly responded, smiling along with the festive atmosphere that was sweeping over the cars and the army tanks, which had civilians climbing on top or posing for photos near them.
Another bit of magic: Drivers patiently waited for the square to be clear of vehicles that preceded them, and only then did they proceed into the huge area. Self-appointed traffic supervisors, perhaps traffic supervisors of the revolution, kept things rolling along better than any member of the hated police force. Everyone heeded their orders, even if they contradicted the orders of another.
"We have never seen such an empty space in the square, with drivers respecting others in such a way," the Cairene native commented with surprise.
A poster declared that today was a day for making Tahrir Square beautiful. Dozens of young and not-so-young persons were busy sweeping the surrounding sidewalks and the streets, collecting garbage, painting the edges of the sidewalk in black and white and the railings in green and gold. Some of the younger ones warned passersby not to step on the fresh paint.
"The Youth of the Revolution" is what they are calling themselves and they say it all started on Facebook (could it be otherwise? ). They say they themselves contributed money to pay the sweepers and to cover the cost of paint and brushes.
Irrespective of who initiated and who is paying, the cleaning and painting work, like the unusual show of generosity of the drivers, are an "embarrassment" to the regime: They expose its responsibility for all the violence seen as endemic to the day-to-day life of this city, along with the dirt, the neglect, the endless noise, the ongoing confrontations between the drivers.
"In three weeks of revolution we did not experience any sexual harassment by men," a woman said surprised. "What civilization emerged in these weeks! What culture!"
The activists are already talking about the days of the uprising as if they took place a generation ago, and now one must hurry and put memories to paper.
"The way ahead of us is long, that is true," said a teacher of Arabic, who works as a taxi driver to supplement his monthly income of $120 per month after 22 years on the job. "But before the path was blocked, a dead end."
His right hand is bandaged. He was injured when the local popular committee in which he is a member confronted a thief. "Those small criminals that the regime sent out - that is how they would always do it. [Mubarak] impoverished us and terrorized us just so we would need him and think we could not do without him."
In the square I heard some people complaining about the fact that others were happy at the fall of Mubarak and his ministers. The teacher-driver explained: "There are those, like the peanut seller, whom you told me of, who now feel pity for the side that lost. They are emotional. There are those who act that way because it is convenient for them, materially: They do not feel our pain."
He too spoke with pride of civilization: "The world thought that we are not developed - and here we are proving who we are. During the Mubarak period people were embarrassed to say they were Egyptian. We felt occupied. When it is another country occupying you, it is easier than when the occupier is from your own nation."
Was someone behind this change? Did it evolve on its own, unintentionally? Was this a signal that the people - that hidden entity, which grew and developed into such a visible, vibrant creature in three weeks - are warning the army not to forget who is sovereign? Or perhaps those who listen carefully are attributing too much meaning to the change in words?
There is no answer, but the fact that the question is being asked just goes to show how proud the people are that their revolution was guided by some sort of internal logic, a collective logic, with a great deal of dialogue and listening. Not by orders, not by dictates from above. For example, without any directives, it became clear that attention should not be diverted from the main issue: the oppressive regime. There was no other issue, not the United States or Israel, not different economic visions or other problems, and certainly not the disagreements between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular population. Each in its own time.
The "regular" protesters allowed themselves a break on Sunday, staying in bed a little longer and keeping away from the square. It and its access roads reverted to being used for vehicular traffic.
But the magic is not over: Not only this writer - three hours into her visit to revolutionary Cairo - but also a resident of the capital noticed as well that drivers are honking less. Only at a specific location were drivers asked to honk, for some unclear reason. And they eagerly responded, smiling along with the festive atmosphere that was sweeping over the cars and the army tanks, which had civilians climbing on top or posing for photos near them.
Another bit of magic: Drivers patiently waited for the square to be clear of vehicles that preceded them, and only then did they proceed into the huge area. Self-appointed traffic supervisors, perhaps traffic supervisors of the revolution, kept things rolling along better than any member of the hated police force. Everyone heeded their orders, even if they contradicted the orders of another.
"We have never seen such an empty space in the square, with drivers respecting others in such a way," the Cairene native commented with surprise.
A poster declared that today was a day for making Tahrir Square beautiful. Dozens of young and not-so-young persons were busy sweeping the surrounding sidewalks and the streets, collecting garbage, painting the edges of the sidewalk in black and white and the railings in green and gold. Some of the younger ones warned passersby not to step on the fresh paint.
"The Youth of the Revolution" is what they are calling themselves and they say it all started on Facebook (could it be otherwise? ). They say they themselves contributed money to pay the sweepers and to cover the cost of paint and brushes.
Irrespective of who initiated and who is paying, the cleaning and painting work, like the unusual show of generosity of the drivers, are an "embarrassment" to the regime: They expose its responsibility for all the violence seen as endemic to the day-to-day life of this city, along with the dirt, the neglect, the endless noise, the ongoing confrontations between the drivers.
"In three weeks of revolution we did not experience any sexual harassment by men," a woman said surprised. "What civilization emerged in these weeks! What culture!"
The activists are already talking about the days of the uprising as if they took place a generation ago, and now one must hurry and put memories to paper.
"The way ahead of us is long, that is true," said a teacher of Arabic, who works as a taxi driver to supplement his monthly income of $120 per month after 22 years on the job. "But before the path was blocked, a dead end."
His right hand is bandaged. He was injured when the local popular committee in which he is a member confronted a thief. "Those small criminals that the regime sent out - that is how they would always do it. [Mubarak] impoverished us and terrorized us just so we would need him and think we could not do without him."
In the square I heard some people complaining about the fact that others were happy at the fall of Mubarak and his ministers. The teacher-driver explained: "There are those, like the peanut seller, whom you told me of, who now feel pity for the side that lost. They are emotional. There are those who act that way because it is convenient for them, materially: They do not feel our pain."
He too spoke with pride of civilization: "The world thought that we are not developed - and here we are proving who we are. During the Mubarak period people were embarrassed to say they were Egyptian. We felt occupied. When it is another country occupying you, it is easier than when the occupier is from your own nation."
UPI ثلث الاسر في ليبيا تعيش تحت خط الفقر
أفادت دراسة اقتصادية اجتماعية بأن نحو 29 في المئة من إجمالي الأسر الليبية تعيش تحت خط الفقر، وقدرت خط الاحتياج للأسرة الواحدة بنحو 392 ديناراً (313 دولاراً). ونقلت وكالة «ليبيا برس» عن الدراسة، التي أعدتها أمانة «اللجنة الشعبية العامة للتخطيط والمالية» حول الوضع الاقتصادي والاجتماعي لليبيا، أن عدد السكان تحت خط الفقر ارتفع من نحو 605000 عام 1992 - 1993، إلى نحو 739000 عام 2001. وأضافت أن خط الفقر للشخص الواحد بلغ 576.5 دينار عام 1995، وارتفع إلى 852.4 عام 2000، لينخفض إلى 759 عام 2001.
وقسمت الدراسة الفئات التي تعيش تحت خط الفقر إلى ثلاثة أقسام، يتضمن القسم الأول الأرامل واليتامى والشيوخ والمطلقات الذين لا يتلقون رواتب ولا معيلين لهم، والقسم الثاني الفئات التي تتقاضى المعاش الأساسي، أي اقل من 120 ديناراً، وتتضمن الفئة الثالثة الأسر التي تحصل على معاشات من صندوق التضامن الاجتماعي البالغ عددهم 219832 فرداً. أما أصحاب المعاشات التأمينية التقاعدية (مدني - عسكري) الذين تبلغ معاشاتهم الشهرية اقل من 120 ديناراً، فيقدر عددهم بنحو 210119 فرداً. وبذلك يصبح مجموع إجمالي الأسر التي تتقاضى دخلاً اقل من 120 ديناراً نحو 269879 فرداً، في وقت يبلغ متوسط عدد أفراد الأسرة الليبية ستة أفراد.
وتشير بعض الدراسات إلى أن خط الفقر يقدر وفقاً لعدد السعرات الحرارية التي يستهلكها الشخص الواحد في اليوم، ويصل الحد الأدنى إلى 2100 سعرة حرارية في وقت أوضحت «الهيئة العامة للمعلومات والتوثيق» أن في ليبيا، يبغ الحد الأدنى 2389 سعرة حرارية للشخص في اليوم.
وكان تقرير «الأهداف التنموية في ليبيا» الصادر عام 2010 عن برنامج «الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي»، أكد أن السكان ذوي الدخل المحدود يحصلون على الحد الأدنى من الغذاء. وقد حدد خط الفقر المدقع بنحو 336 ديناراً شهرياً للفرد، أو 418 ديناراً للأسرة. ودعا التقرير إلى ضرورة مضاعفة حجم الإنفاق الجاري من 4214 ديناراً سنوياً إلى 8544 ديناراً، بهدف رفع القدرة الشرائية إلى ما فوق خط الاحتياج.
وسعت ليبيا خلال السنوات الماضية إلى إنشاء صندوق يُعنى بالمحرومين من الثروة لمن تقل مداخيلهم عن 200 دينار ومنحت 248456 وثيقة استثمارية بهدف القضاء على الفقر.
وقسمت الدراسة الفئات التي تعيش تحت خط الفقر إلى ثلاثة أقسام، يتضمن القسم الأول الأرامل واليتامى والشيوخ والمطلقات الذين لا يتلقون رواتب ولا معيلين لهم، والقسم الثاني الفئات التي تتقاضى المعاش الأساسي، أي اقل من 120 ديناراً، وتتضمن الفئة الثالثة الأسر التي تحصل على معاشات من صندوق التضامن الاجتماعي البالغ عددهم 219832 فرداً. أما أصحاب المعاشات التأمينية التقاعدية (مدني - عسكري) الذين تبلغ معاشاتهم الشهرية اقل من 120 ديناراً، فيقدر عددهم بنحو 210119 فرداً. وبذلك يصبح مجموع إجمالي الأسر التي تتقاضى دخلاً اقل من 120 ديناراً نحو 269879 فرداً، في وقت يبلغ متوسط عدد أفراد الأسرة الليبية ستة أفراد.
وتشير بعض الدراسات إلى أن خط الفقر يقدر وفقاً لعدد السعرات الحرارية التي يستهلكها الشخص الواحد في اليوم، ويصل الحد الأدنى إلى 2100 سعرة حرارية في وقت أوضحت «الهيئة العامة للمعلومات والتوثيق» أن في ليبيا، يبغ الحد الأدنى 2389 سعرة حرارية للشخص في اليوم.
وكان تقرير «الأهداف التنموية في ليبيا» الصادر عام 2010 عن برنامج «الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي»، أكد أن السكان ذوي الدخل المحدود يحصلون على الحد الأدنى من الغذاء. وقد حدد خط الفقر المدقع بنحو 336 ديناراً شهرياً للفرد، أو 418 ديناراً للأسرة. ودعا التقرير إلى ضرورة مضاعفة حجم الإنفاق الجاري من 4214 ديناراً سنوياً إلى 8544 ديناراً، بهدف رفع القدرة الشرائية إلى ما فوق خط الاحتياج.
وسعت ليبيا خلال السنوات الماضية إلى إنشاء صندوق يُعنى بالمحرومين من الثروة لمن تقل مداخيلهم عن 200 دينار ومنحت 248456 وثيقة استثمارية بهدف القضاء على الفقر.
إيران تحبط المظاهرات باغلاق الطرق المؤدية الى قادة المعارضة : مير حسين موسوي
طهران: اغلقت قوات الامن الايرانية الاثنين الطرق المؤدية الى منزل احد زعماء المعارضة رئيس الوزراء السابق مير حسين موسوي.
وقال موقع "موسوي" على الانترنت ان السلطات قطعت أيضا خطوط الهاتف عن منزله لمنعه من المشاركة في مظاهرة.
وقد تم وضع زعيم المعارضة الاخر زعيم مجلس الشوري السابق مهدي كروبي قيد الاقامة الجبرية منذ يوم الخميس الماضي.
وكان زعيما المعارضة مير حسين موسوي ومهدي كروبي تقدما بطلب للحصول على اذن لتنظيم تجمعات لدعم الثورة التونسية والانتفاضة الشعبية في مصر، لكن السلطة اعتبرت انها وسيلة للتظاهر ضد الحكومة.
ويذكر ان وزارة الداخلية في ايران اكدت انها لن تسمح للمعارضة بتنظيم تجمعات اليوم الاثنين لدعم حركات الانتفاضة في دول عربية حتى لاتتحول الى تظاهرات مناهضة للحكومة.
ونقلت وكالة "فارس" الايرانية عن مهدي علي خاني صدر المسئول الكبير في المكتب السياسي لوزارة الداخلية قوله: "ان عناصر المعارضة يدركون تماما الطبيعة غير القانونية لهذا الطلب، يعرفون انهم لن يحصلوا على الاذن لاعمال شغب".
ورأى انصار النظام ان قادة المعارضة يسعون قبل اي شيء الى استخدام تجمعات التضامن هذه للاحتجاج على الحكومة كما حصل اثناء موجة التظاهرات التي تلت اعادة انتخاب الرئيس الايراني محمود احمدي نجاد المثيرة للجدل في يونيو/حزيران 2009.
Rollin', rollin', rollin' Song: Rawhide
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl2fONPgIJE
Album: The Best of Frankie Laine
Rollin', rollin', rollin'.
Rollin', rollin', rollin'.
Rollin', rollin', rollin'.
Rollin', rollin', rollin'.
Rawhide!
Hah! Hah!
Keep rollin', rollin', rollin',
Though the streams are swollen,
Keep them dogies rollin', rawhide.
Through rain and wind and weather,
Hell bent for leather,
Wishin' my gal was by my side.
All the things I'm missin',
Good vittles, love, and kissin',
Are waiting at the end of my ride.
Move 'em out, head 'em up,
Head 'em up, move 'em on.
Move 'em out, head 'em up:
Rawhide.
Cut 'em out, ride 'em in,
Ride 'em in, cut 'em out,
Cut 'em out, ride 'em in:
Rawhide!
Hah! Hah!
Movin', movin', movin',
Though they're disapprovin',
Keep them dogies movin', rawhide.
Don't try to understand 'em,
Just rope an' throw an' brand 'em.
Soon we'll be living high and wide.
My heart's calculatin',
My true love will be waitin':
Waitin' at the end of my ride.
Move 'em out, head 'em up,
Head 'em up, move 'em on.
Move 'em out, head 'em up:
Rawhide.
Cut 'em out, ride 'em in,
Ride 'em in, cut 'em out,
Cut 'em out, ride 'em in:
Rawhide!
(Rollin', rollin', rollin'.)
(Rollin', rollin', rollin'.)
Hah!
(Rollin', rollin', rollin'.)
Hah!
(Rollin', rollin', rollin'.)
Rawhide.
Hah!
Rawhide!
Album: The Best of Frankie Laine
Rollin', rollin', rollin'.
Rollin', rollin', rollin'.
Rollin', rollin', rollin'.
Rollin', rollin', rollin'.
Rawhide!
Hah! Hah!
Keep rollin', rollin', rollin',
Though the streams are swollen,
Keep them dogies rollin', rawhide.
Through rain and wind and weather,
Hell bent for leather,
Wishin' my gal was by my side.
All the things I'm missin',
Good vittles, love, and kissin',
Are waiting at the end of my ride.
Move 'em out, head 'em up,
Head 'em up, move 'em on.
Move 'em out, head 'em up:
Rawhide.
Cut 'em out, ride 'em in,
Ride 'em in, cut 'em out,
Cut 'em out, ride 'em in:
Rawhide!
Hah! Hah!
Movin', movin', movin',
Though they're disapprovin',
Keep them dogies movin', rawhide.
Don't try to understand 'em,
Just rope an' throw an' brand 'em.
Soon we'll be living high and wide.
My heart's calculatin',
My true love will be waitin':
Waitin' at the end of my ride.
Move 'em out, head 'em up,
Head 'em up, move 'em on.
Move 'em out, head 'em up:
Rawhide.
Cut 'em out, ride 'em in,
Ride 'em in, cut 'em out,
Cut 'em out, ride 'em in:
Rawhide!
(Rollin', rollin', rollin'.)
(Rollin', rollin', rollin'.)
Hah!
(Rollin', rollin', rollin'.)
Hah!
(Rollin', rollin', rollin'.)
Rawhide.
Hah!
Rawhide!
105 قتلى في اشتباكات بجنوب السودان : CNN
نتائج الاستفتاء أيدت بشكل كاسح انفصال الجنوب عن الشمالجوبا، جنوب السودان أعلنت حكومة جنوب السودان، الأحد، مقتل ما يزيد عن مائة شخص وإصابة العشرات في اشتباكات مسلحة بين قواتها ومليشيات الجنرال المنشق، جورج أطور، في ولاية جونقلي.
وقال بيتر أغوير المتحدث باسم "الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان" التي تتولى مقاليد الحكم في جنوب السودان الذي يتمتع بحكم ذاتي، إن 79 قتيلاً سقطوا، بينهم 20 في صفوف القوات الحكومية، و39 مدنياً و30 من المليشيات المسلحة، عندما هاجمت قوات أطور محافظة "فنجاك".
وقتل أربعة جنود بالإضافة إلى 12 مسلحاً، في هجوم آخر شنته عناصر أطور على بلدة "بور."
وأوضح أغوير أن 105 أشخاص قتلوا في الهجومين اللذين وقعا يومي الأربعاء والخميس.
ويشار إلى أن "الجيش الشعبي لتحرير السودان""، هو الجناح العسكري لـ"الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان"، التي تتولى مقاليد في جنوب السودان، الذي صوت بأغلبية ساحقة لصالح الانفصال عن الشمال.
وتبادل الطرفان الاتهامات حول البدء في المواجهات العسكرية على الرغم من توقيع اتفاق لوقف إطلاق النار بين الطرفين في يناير/كانون الثاني الماضي.
وكان أطور قد انشق عن الحركة وحمل السلاح ضدها إثر الإخفاق في انتخابه حاكماً لولاية جونغلي عام 2010، إلا أنه عاد ووقع هدنة معها في يناير/كانون الثاني الفائت، وقبيل الاستفتاء المفصلي الذي أجري في التاسع من الشهر ذاته.
ومن جانبه أكد الناطق باسم "الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان"، ين ماثيو، أن الحكومة تدعم مذكرة التفاهم الموقعة مع أطور، مضيفاً: "سنتحادث معه للوصول إلى حل سلمي."
وقال إن الجيش الشعبي ما زال ملتزماً بنهج السلام والمصالحة الذي اختطه رئيس حكومة الجنوب.
وفيما يستعد جنوب السودان لإعلانه دولة مستقلة في التاسع من يوليو/تموز المقبل، تتزايد المخاوف من اندلاع مواجهات بين المليشيات المنشقة.
ويذكر أن جنوب السودان صوت مؤخراً في استفتاء مفصلي جاءت نتائجه لصالح الانفصال عن الشمال، ليكون بذلك أحدث دول العالم.
وقد أظهر فرز الأصوات أن سكان الجنوب "رجحوا خيار الانفصال،" في حين أظهرت الأرقام التي عرضتها المفوضية تأييداً كاسحاً لطرح تشكيل دولة مستقلة في الجنوب قارب 99 في المائة.
هذا، وفي حال تحقق الانفصال في السودان، فهذا يعني أن أكبر دولة أفريقية من حيث المساحة ستنقسم إلى دولتين، وبالتالي سيعاد رسم خارطة أفريقيا.
وقال بيتر أغوير المتحدث باسم "الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان" التي تتولى مقاليد الحكم في جنوب السودان الذي يتمتع بحكم ذاتي، إن 79 قتيلاً سقطوا، بينهم 20 في صفوف القوات الحكومية، و39 مدنياً و30 من المليشيات المسلحة، عندما هاجمت قوات أطور محافظة "فنجاك".
وقتل أربعة جنود بالإضافة إلى 12 مسلحاً، في هجوم آخر شنته عناصر أطور على بلدة "بور."
وأوضح أغوير أن 105 أشخاص قتلوا في الهجومين اللذين وقعا يومي الأربعاء والخميس.
ويشار إلى أن "الجيش الشعبي لتحرير السودان""، هو الجناح العسكري لـ"الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان"، التي تتولى مقاليد في جنوب السودان، الذي صوت بأغلبية ساحقة لصالح الانفصال عن الشمال.
وتبادل الطرفان الاتهامات حول البدء في المواجهات العسكرية على الرغم من توقيع اتفاق لوقف إطلاق النار بين الطرفين في يناير/كانون الثاني الماضي.
وكان أطور قد انشق عن الحركة وحمل السلاح ضدها إثر الإخفاق في انتخابه حاكماً لولاية جونغلي عام 2010، إلا أنه عاد ووقع هدنة معها في يناير/كانون الثاني الفائت، وقبيل الاستفتاء المفصلي الذي أجري في التاسع من الشهر ذاته.
ومن جانبه أكد الناطق باسم "الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان"، ين ماثيو، أن الحكومة تدعم مذكرة التفاهم الموقعة مع أطور، مضيفاً: "سنتحادث معه للوصول إلى حل سلمي."
وقال إن الجيش الشعبي ما زال ملتزماً بنهج السلام والمصالحة الذي اختطه رئيس حكومة الجنوب.
وفيما يستعد جنوب السودان لإعلانه دولة مستقلة في التاسع من يوليو/تموز المقبل، تتزايد المخاوف من اندلاع مواجهات بين المليشيات المنشقة.
ويذكر أن جنوب السودان صوت مؤخراً في استفتاء مفصلي جاءت نتائجه لصالح الانفصال عن الشمال، ليكون بذلك أحدث دول العالم.
وقد أظهر فرز الأصوات أن سكان الجنوب "رجحوا خيار الانفصال،" في حين أظهرت الأرقام التي عرضتها المفوضية تأييداً كاسحاً لطرح تشكيل دولة مستقلة في الجنوب قارب 99 في المائة.
هذا، وفي حال تحقق الانفصال في السودان، فهذا يعني أن أكبر دولة أفريقية من حيث المساحة ستنقسم إلى دولتين، وبالتالي سيعاد رسم خارطة أفريقيا.
Quand Israël lorgne sur l’or blanc du Nil :Manlio Dinucci
عندما تنظر اسرائيل الى مياه نهر النيل بعين الذئب
رحيل مبارك يقلق اسرائيل ليس لحماية الحدود فحسب، وانما من ذهاب الاحلام بالاستيلاء على مياه النيل.
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Israël, écrit le New York Times, fait pression sur l’administration Obama pour qu’elle assure une « transition ordonnée » de l’après-Moubarak, craignant qu’un nouveau gouvernement égyptien « n’abandonne l’attitude bénévole du président envers Israël ».
Cours du Nil en Egypte : à travers le canal Al-Salam son eau arrive, en passant sous le canal de Suez, d’une branche du delta jusque dans le Sinaï septentrional, à quelques dizaines de kilomètres seulement de la frontière avec Israël et Gaza.Parmi les concessions que Tel Aviv espérait obtenir de Moubarak, il y en a une dont on ne parle pas mais qui revêt une importance stratégique fondamentale : l’accès israélien aux eaux du Nil.
L’Egypte, née du Nil, continue à fonder sa vie sur le grand fleuve qui court sur 1.500 Kms de la frontière méridionale à l’embouchure en delta sur la Méditerranée, en créant une longue, fertile vallée à travers le désert. Sur ses rives et dans la zone du delta se concentre plus de 95% de la population, atteignant presque les 85 millions. La digue d’Assouan, construite avec l‘assistance de l’URSS en 1960-1971, a créé un vaste lac artificiel, le Nasser. Puis dans les années 90, a commencé la construction d’autres grandes œuvres hydrauliques. Parmi celles-ci le canal Al-Salam, qui apporte l’eau d’une branche du delta vers l’est jusqu’à la péninsule du Sinaï, en passant par des canaux souterrains sous le Canal de Suez Ces œuvres, tandis qu’elles permettent d‘irriguer de nouvelles terres et produire de l’énergie électrique, diminuent la portée du Nil et la quantité de limon qu’il transporte, en provoquant un recul du delta et, en conséquence, la perte de terres fertiles.
Il est vital, pour l’Egypte, de continuer à disposer amplement des eaux du Nil. En amont, dans la bassin du fleuve (long de 6.671 Kms) et des ses affluents, se trouvent cependant huit autres pays : Soudan, Ethiopie, Kenya, Ouganda, Congo (Rep. Dém.), Rwanda, Burundi et Tanzanie. Avec l’Egypte, ils font partie de l’Initiative du bassin du Nil, un partenariat pour la cogestion des ressources hydriques de la zone. Tâche pas facile. Selon des accords remontant à l’époque du colonialisme britannique, Egypte et Soudan auraient le droit d’utiliser 80% de l’eau. Mais les autres pays revendiquent une plus grande part et en 2010 ils ont conclu un accord qu’Egypte et Soudan se refusent à signer
Sommet arabe le 29 mars à Bagdad : قمة عربية في بغداد
أعلن قيس العزاوي عن انعقاد القمة العربية في بغداد، وأطلق المواطنون العرب نكاتهم ساخرين من هذه القمة على انها لقاء للتعارف على الرؤساء الجدد.ونذكر بان القمة العربية لم تنعقد في بغداد منذ عام1978
Le sommet annuel des chefs d'Etat de la Ligue arabe aura lieu le 29 mars à Bagdad, a déclaré lundi à la presse l'ambassadeur irakien auprès de l'institution panarabe, qui siège au Caire.
"Le sommet de la Ligue arabe se tiendra à Bagdad le 29 mars", a déclaré le diplomate, Qais al-Azzawi, en marge d'une réunion des représentants permanents auprès de cette institution.
L'Irak n'a plus été l'hôte d'un sommet arabe régulier depuis novembre 1978 et d'un sommet extraordinaire depuis mai 1990.
Le sommet annuel des chefs d'Etat de la Ligue arabe aura lieu le 29 mars à Bagdad, a déclaré lundi à la presse l'ambassadeur irakien auprès de l'institution panarabe, qui siège au Caire.
"Le sommet de la Ligue arabe se tiendra à Bagdad le 29 mars", a déclaré le diplomate, Qais al-Azzawi, en marge d'une réunion des représentants permanents auprès de cette institution.
L'Irak n'a plus été l'hôte d'un sommet arabe régulier depuis novembre 1978 et d'un sommet extraordinaire depuis mai 1990.
مشادة عنيفة بين أبناء مبارك وتدهور صحة مبارك الى حد الاغماء : من الصحف والوكالات
أشارت عدد من الصحف إلى توتر حاد بين أعضاء عائلة مبارك قبيل ساعات التنحيدبي، الإمارات العربية المتحدة تواصل الصحف العربية التركيز على انتفاضة مصر التي كان الشباب عصبها، إلا أنها أولت، الاثنين، اهتماماً خاصاً باللحظات الأخيرة للرئيس المصري، حسني مبارك، في الحكم، وأنه هرب أمواله من سويسرا إلى السعودية والإمارات والبحرين، ومشادة حادة بين نجليه حمل فيها علاء شقيقه الأصغر، جمال، مسؤولية ما حدث، كما أشار بعضها إلى تدهور الحالة الصحية لمبارك.
القدس العربي
"طنطاوي حاكما لـ 6 شهور.. وتعطيل الدستور وحل البرلمان وانتخابات جديدة.. وتفاصيل الساعات الأخيرة في قصر العروبة".. مبارك يهرب أمواله من سويسرا إلى السعودية والإمارات والبحرين".. لندن تنتظر طلبا رسميا لتجميد أرصدته.. وصحفها تتحدث عن بذخ جمال
الرئيس المخلوع حسني مبارك قام بتحريك أموال ضخمة من أرصدته في بنوك سويسرية خاصة الى دول خليجية، بينها السعودية والبحرين اثناء الثورة التي أطاحت به، خشية تجميدها كما حدث مع زين العابدين بن علي."
""من جهتها نقلت صحيفة 'صنداي ميرور' اللندنية عن مارك مالوك براون وزير الدولة البريطاني السابق للشؤون الخارجية في حكومة حزب العمال، اتهامه حكومة ديفيد كاميرون بـ'عدم إدانة مبارك بما فيه الكفاية، والمبادرة إلى تجميد أمواله وأصول ابنه جمال، الذي تردد بأنه كان يسهر قبل أيام في الملهى الليلي (ترامب) وسط لندن وانفق 16 ألف جنيه إسترليني على الشمبانيا'."
"وأشارت الصحيفة إلى أن هناك مخاوف من أن عائلة مبارك ستفرّ إلى لندن، حيث تملك منزلاً فخماً قيمته عدة ملايين من الجنيهات الإسترلينية في منطقة بلغريفيا الواقعة بوسط لندن."
"والى ذلك تباينت القصص حول الساعات الأخيرة لمبارك في قصر العروبة، وأشارت تقارير إلى أن تشابكا بالأيدي نشب بين نجلي مبارك بسبب غضب علاء من جمال وسياساته التي 'ضيعت تاريخ الوالد في خدمة مصر وجعلته متهما في ذمته."
وفي الشأن ذاته نقلت "الخليج" التي تصدر في إمارة الشارقة بعنوان: "روايتان حول تحميل جمال مبارك "مسؤولية ما جرى"
"أنت السبب في ما جرى، ووالدك دفع الثمن" . كانت تلك الجملة بداية تلاسن حاد وقع بين نجلي الرئيس المصري السابق حسني مبارك قبل يومين داخل القصر الرئاسي، في أعقاب تسجيل الأخير خطابه الذي استبق إعلان تنحيه عن السلطة."
"واحتد علاء على شقيقه جمال وحمله المسؤولية كاملة لما جرى في مصر من أحداث أجبرت الأب على الانسحاب بتلك الصورة "التي لا تليق به" . وقالت صحيفة "الأخبار" إن الملاسنة "كادت تتطور إلى تشابك بالأيدي" وسمعها من كان داخل القصر، وانتهت بعد تدخل شخصيات كبيرة كانت حاضرة أثناء تسجيل الخطاب."
"وقال علاء لشقيقه "لقد أفسدت البلد عندما فتحت الطريق أمام أصحابك، وهذه هي النتيجة، فبدلاً من تكريم أبيك في نهاية حياته، ساعدت على تشويه صورته على هذا النحو"."
القبس
القبس تواصل نشر تفاصيل آخر 48 ساعة في القصر.. وأول يوم لمبارك كرئيس سابق..علاء لجمال في مشادة عنيفة: أنت وأصحابك السبب!
وبدورها اهتمت الصحيفة الكويتية باللحظات الأخيرة لمبارك في الحكم، وكتبت: حصلت القبس على معلومات جديدة حول تفاصيل آخر 48 ساعة من حكم الرئيس حسني مبارك لمصر، الخميس والجمعة الماضيين، وتفاصيل اليوم الأول من حياته كرئيس «سابق»."
"فقد كشف مصدر داخل القصر الرئاسي أن يوم الخميس كان يوماً متوتراً على جميع أفراد أسرة الرئيس، خصوصا نجله الأكبر علاء، الذي بقي بقرب والده في جناحه الخاص بالطابق الأرضي، وكان كثير البكاء وهو يرى ما يلقاه أبوه من ردود فعل غاضبة في الشارع وعبارات مهينة ولافتات تحمل كلمات وأوصافا قاسية."
وفي مقطع آخر كتبت: لايخرج من غرفته ولا يطالع الصحف: "كشف المصدر المطلع لـ القبس أن معلومات موثوق بها أكدت أن الرئيس السابق في حالة ذهول شديد لدرجة توقفه عن تناول أدويته، وعدم رغبته في تناول الطعام، وعدم خروجه من غرفته لممارسة رياضة المشي التي كان يواظب عليها صباح كل يوم، ولم يعد يطلب الصحف لقراءتها."
"ويختم المصدر أن مبارك أقسم مرات عدة على عدم مغادرة مصر، وأنه ليس بن علي (الرئيس التونسي المخلوع)، مردداً: «العسكري يموت في الميدان، وأنا لست جباناً.. سأموت وأدفن في تراب بلدي الذي خدمته بكل إخلاص طوال 61 عاماً»."
المصريون
وبدورها نشرت الصحيفة المصرية تحت عنوان: "قالت صحيفة "الوسط" البحرينية إن الحالة الصحية للرئيس السابق محمد حسنى مبارك تدهورت في الساعات القليلة الماضية"
وجاء في الخبر: "ونقلت الصحيفة عن مصادر رفضت الكشف عن هويتها قولها إنها "مقربة من مبارك"، إنه في حالة غيبوبة كاملة."
"وأشارت الصحيفة إلى أن الناحية الصحية لمبارك تدهورت أمس الأول الجمعة أيضا، حيث تعرض للإغماء مرتين أثناء تسجيل خطابه الذي فوض فيه صلاحياته لنائبه عمر سليمان."
الوفد
أبوالغيط يحرق وثائق بتكليفات مخزية للخارجية
أوردت الصحيفة المصرية: "ذكر مصدر مطلع أن أحمد أبو الغيط وزير الخارجية يقوم بالإشراف بنفسه على حرق وثائق داخل وزارة الخارجية تحوى- حسب المصدر- تكليفات خاصة صدرت من الرئيس المخلوع مبارك للوزير ولعديد من الدبلوماسيين لا تمت للعمل الدبلوماسي بصلة."
"ورأى المصدر أن هذه التكليفات مهينة ومخزية للعمل الدبلوماسي ولوزير بذل جهودا مستميتة منذ اندلاع الثورة لبقاء مبارك خوفا من افتضاح أمره."
القدس العربي
"طنطاوي حاكما لـ 6 شهور.. وتعطيل الدستور وحل البرلمان وانتخابات جديدة.. وتفاصيل الساعات الأخيرة في قصر العروبة".. مبارك يهرب أمواله من سويسرا إلى السعودية والإمارات والبحرين".. لندن تنتظر طلبا رسميا لتجميد أرصدته.. وصحفها تتحدث عن بذخ جمال
الرئيس المخلوع حسني مبارك قام بتحريك أموال ضخمة من أرصدته في بنوك سويسرية خاصة الى دول خليجية، بينها السعودية والبحرين اثناء الثورة التي أطاحت به، خشية تجميدها كما حدث مع زين العابدين بن علي."
""من جهتها نقلت صحيفة 'صنداي ميرور' اللندنية عن مارك مالوك براون وزير الدولة البريطاني السابق للشؤون الخارجية في حكومة حزب العمال، اتهامه حكومة ديفيد كاميرون بـ'عدم إدانة مبارك بما فيه الكفاية، والمبادرة إلى تجميد أمواله وأصول ابنه جمال، الذي تردد بأنه كان يسهر قبل أيام في الملهى الليلي (ترامب) وسط لندن وانفق 16 ألف جنيه إسترليني على الشمبانيا'."
"وأشارت الصحيفة إلى أن هناك مخاوف من أن عائلة مبارك ستفرّ إلى لندن، حيث تملك منزلاً فخماً قيمته عدة ملايين من الجنيهات الإسترلينية في منطقة بلغريفيا الواقعة بوسط لندن."
"والى ذلك تباينت القصص حول الساعات الأخيرة لمبارك في قصر العروبة، وأشارت تقارير إلى أن تشابكا بالأيدي نشب بين نجلي مبارك بسبب غضب علاء من جمال وسياساته التي 'ضيعت تاريخ الوالد في خدمة مصر وجعلته متهما في ذمته."
وفي الشأن ذاته نقلت "الخليج" التي تصدر في إمارة الشارقة بعنوان: "روايتان حول تحميل جمال مبارك "مسؤولية ما جرى"
"أنت السبب في ما جرى، ووالدك دفع الثمن" . كانت تلك الجملة بداية تلاسن حاد وقع بين نجلي الرئيس المصري السابق حسني مبارك قبل يومين داخل القصر الرئاسي، في أعقاب تسجيل الأخير خطابه الذي استبق إعلان تنحيه عن السلطة."
"واحتد علاء على شقيقه جمال وحمله المسؤولية كاملة لما جرى في مصر من أحداث أجبرت الأب على الانسحاب بتلك الصورة "التي لا تليق به" . وقالت صحيفة "الأخبار" إن الملاسنة "كادت تتطور إلى تشابك بالأيدي" وسمعها من كان داخل القصر، وانتهت بعد تدخل شخصيات كبيرة كانت حاضرة أثناء تسجيل الخطاب."
"وقال علاء لشقيقه "لقد أفسدت البلد عندما فتحت الطريق أمام أصحابك، وهذه هي النتيجة، فبدلاً من تكريم أبيك في نهاية حياته، ساعدت على تشويه صورته على هذا النحو"."
القبس
القبس تواصل نشر تفاصيل آخر 48 ساعة في القصر.. وأول يوم لمبارك كرئيس سابق..علاء لجمال في مشادة عنيفة: أنت وأصحابك السبب!
وبدورها اهتمت الصحيفة الكويتية باللحظات الأخيرة لمبارك في الحكم، وكتبت: حصلت القبس على معلومات جديدة حول تفاصيل آخر 48 ساعة من حكم الرئيس حسني مبارك لمصر، الخميس والجمعة الماضيين، وتفاصيل اليوم الأول من حياته كرئيس «سابق»."
"فقد كشف مصدر داخل القصر الرئاسي أن يوم الخميس كان يوماً متوتراً على جميع أفراد أسرة الرئيس، خصوصا نجله الأكبر علاء، الذي بقي بقرب والده في جناحه الخاص بالطابق الأرضي، وكان كثير البكاء وهو يرى ما يلقاه أبوه من ردود فعل غاضبة في الشارع وعبارات مهينة ولافتات تحمل كلمات وأوصافا قاسية."
وفي مقطع آخر كتبت: لايخرج من غرفته ولا يطالع الصحف: "كشف المصدر المطلع لـ القبس أن معلومات موثوق بها أكدت أن الرئيس السابق في حالة ذهول شديد لدرجة توقفه عن تناول أدويته، وعدم رغبته في تناول الطعام، وعدم خروجه من غرفته لممارسة رياضة المشي التي كان يواظب عليها صباح كل يوم، ولم يعد يطلب الصحف لقراءتها."
"ويختم المصدر أن مبارك أقسم مرات عدة على عدم مغادرة مصر، وأنه ليس بن علي (الرئيس التونسي المخلوع)، مردداً: «العسكري يموت في الميدان، وأنا لست جباناً.. سأموت وأدفن في تراب بلدي الذي خدمته بكل إخلاص طوال 61 عاماً»."
المصريون
وبدورها نشرت الصحيفة المصرية تحت عنوان: "قالت صحيفة "الوسط" البحرينية إن الحالة الصحية للرئيس السابق محمد حسنى مبارك تدهورت في الساعات القليلة الماضية"
وجاء في الخبر: "ونقلت الصحيفة عن مصادر رفضت الكشف عن هويتها قولها إنها "مقربة من مبارك"، إنه في حالة غيبوبة كاملة."
"وأشارت الصحيفة إلى أن الناحية الصحية لمبارك تدهورت أمس الأول الجمعة أيضا، حيث تعرض للإغماء مرتين أثناء تسجيل خطابه الذي فوض فيه صلاحياته لنائبه عمر سليمان."
الوفد
أبوالغيط يحرق وثائق بتكليفات مخزية للخارجية
أوردت الصحيفة المصرية: "ذكر مصدر مطلع أن أحمد أبو الغيط وزير الخارجية يقوم بالإشراف بنفسه على حرق وثائق داخل وزارة الخارجية تحوى- حسب المصدر- تكليفات خاصة صدرت من الرئيس المخلوع مبارك للوزير ولعديد من الدبلوماسيين لا تمت للعمل الدبلوماسي بصلة."
"ورأى المصدر أن هذه التكليفات مهينة ومخزية للعمل الدبلوماسي ولوزير بذل جهودا مستميتة منذ اندلاع الثورة لبقاء مبارك خوفا من افتضاح أمره."
Jen Marlowe, The Freedom Reading List : Jen Marlowe
With Hosni Mubarak gone, let’s do a little Egyptian math on the Mubarak years.
According to experts, the fortune amassed by Egypt’s former president and his two sons (both billionaires) could reach $70 billion. That includes funds in secret offshore bank accounts and investments in residences and real-estate properties reaching from Rodeo Drive in Beverley Hills to Wilton Place in central London and Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheik tourist resort. Since Mubarak has been president for 30 years, he’s put that little fortune together at a record clip -- something like $2 billion or more a year. He and his family are now worth approximately four times the gross domestic product (GDP) of Paraguay, five times the GDP of embattled Afghanistan, and more than ten times the GDP of Laos. He may be the richest man and they the richest family on Earth. All this happened, by the way, in the years when millions of Egyptians -- at least one in every 10 -- lost their farms, while more than 40% of Egyptians live on less than $2 a day.
And let’s just mention a few others in the cast of characters who let the good times roll and made a few bucks off the reign of the Mubarak family: steel magnate and ruling party insider Ahmed Ezz, for instance, managed to eke out a $3 billion fortune, while former Interior Minister Habib Ibrahim El-Adly scraped by with a near-rock-bottom $1.2 billion. And they are just two of at least five much-loathed Mubarak cronies who reportedly crossed the billion-dollar mark in these years.
As for a trio of Washington lobbyists -- former Republican representative Bob Livingston, former Democratic representative Toby Moffett, and mover-and-shaker Tony Podesta -- who bravely hired themselves out to the Mubarak regime, they made chump change: reportedly a mere $1 million a year for their efforts. Who knows what Frank Wisner, the former ambassador sent to Cairo by the Obama administration to give Mubarak the boot, made working for Patton, Boggs, a company which proudly boasts of the litigation work it’s done for Mubarak and company? Conflict of interest anyone?
Meanwhile, don’t forget the Egyptian military. It didn’t do so badly in the Mubarak years either. After all, according to one expert, it owns "virtually every industry in the country," and it still managed to take in a handy $35 billion in “aid” from Washington since 1978.
As for ordinary Egyptians who protested the devolving state of their country? Estimates of the number of political prisoners in Egypt’s grim jails have varied over the years from 6,000 to 17,000. Their well-being was overseen by former head of intelligence Omar Suleiman. Since Egypt was a “torture destination of choice” for the Bush administration’s Global War on Terror, Suleiman happily oversaw that program, too, as Mubarak’s torturer-in-chief. Appointed vice president by his pal, Suleiman was the “democrat” the Obama administration seemed ready to back until recently to manage the “transition to democracy.”
All in all, should we wonder that such a torturing kleptocracy on the Nile is now being shaken to its foundations and that another spirit, a spirit of democracy, freedom, and justice, is rising in the region? Sometimes such a spirit can be caught in the story of a single ordinary, yet remarkable, life. Jen Marlowe has done so in her just-published book The Hour of Sunlight: One Palestinian’s Journey from Prisoner to Peacemaker. It’s a remarkable story about how even prison can prepare the way for another world and its message, as Marlowe’s latest TomDispatch post indicates, is particularly appropriate for this Middle Eastern moment. (To catch Timothy MacBain’s latest TomCast audio interview in which Marlowe discusses how prison became university for one Palestinian prisoner, click here, or download it to your iPod here.) Tom
According to experts, the fortune amassed by Egypt’s former president and his two sons (both billionaires) could reach $70 billion. That includes funds in secret offshore bank accounts and investments in residences and real-estate properties reaching from Rodeo Drive in Beverley Hills to Wilton Place in central London and Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheik tourist resort. Since Mubarak has been president for 30 years, he’s put that little fortune together at a record clip -- something like $2 billion or more a year. He and his family are now worth approximately four times the gross domestic product (GDP) of Paraguay, five times the GDP of embattled Afghanistan, and more than ten times the GDP of Laos. He may be the richest man and they the richest family on Earth. All this happened, by the way, in the years when millions of Egyptians -- at least one in every 10 -- lost their farms, while more than 40% of Egyptians live on less than $2 a day.
And let’s just mention a few others in the cast of characters who let the good times roll and made a few bucks off the reign of the Mubarak family: steel magnate and ruling party insider Ahmed Ezz, for instance, managed to eke out a $3 billion fortune, while former Interior Minister Habib Ibrahim El-Adly scraped by with a near-rock-bottom $1.2 billion. And they are just two of at least five much-loathed Mubarak cronies who reportedly crossed the billion-dollar mark in these years.
As for a trio of Washington lobbyists -- former Republican representative Bob Livingston, former Democratic representative Toby Moffett, and mover-and-shaker Tony Podesta -- who bravely hired themselves out to the Mubarak regime, they made chump change: reportedly a mere $1 million a year for their efforts. Who knows what Frank Wisner, the former ambassador sent to Cairo by the Obama administration to give Mubarak the boot, made working for Patton, Boggs, a company which proudly boasts of the litigation work it’s done for Mubarak and company? Conflict of interest anyone?
Meanwhile, don’t forget the Egyptian military. It didn’t do so badly in the Mubarak years either. After all, according to one expert, it owns "virtually every industry in the country," and it still managed to take in a handy $35 billion in “aid” from Washington since 1978.
As for ordinary Egyptians who protested the devolving state of their country? Estimates of the number of political prisoners in Egypt’s grim jails have varied over the years from 6,000 to 17,000. Their well-being was overseen by former head of intelligence Omar Suleiman. Since Egypt was a “torture destination of choice” for the Bush administration’s Global War on Terror, Suleiman happily oversaw that program, too, as Mubarak’s torturer-in-chief. Appointed vice president by his pal, Suleiman was the “democrat” the Obama administration seemed ready to back until recently to manage the “transition to democracy.”
All in all, should we wonder that such a torturing kleptocracy on the Nile is now being shaken to its foundations and that another spirit, a spirit of democracy, freedom, and justice, is rising in the region? Sometimes such a spirit can be caught in the story of a single ordinary, yet remarkable, life. Jen Marlowe has done so in her just-published book The Hour of Sunlight: One Palestinian’s Journey from Prisoner to Peacemaker. It’s a remarkable story about how even prison can prepare the way for another world and its message, as Marlowe’s latest TomDispatch post indicates, is particularly appropriate for this Middle Eastern moment. (To catch Timothy MacBain’s latest TomCast audio interview in which Marlowe discusses how prison became university for one Palestinian prisoner, click here, or download it to your iPod here.) Tom
Protecting Israel from its citizens : Avirama Golan
The parliamentary investigative panel to examine organizations' funding sources actually have no interest in questions of legality and constitutionality. All they want is to delegitimize protest and political opinions, and to scare us.
On Tuesday, a Knesset committee is due to approve on second and third readings the bill combating boycotts against Israel - another hysterical proposal by the right wing and Kadima MK Dalia Itzik designed to protect our weak and tiny country, which is being attacked from within and without.
"This law," explain the architects of the proposal, "is designed to protect the State of Israel in general and its citizens in particular from academic, economic and other boycotts that are imposed on the country, its citizens and corporations, due to their connection to the State of Israel." The law is designed to protect "the area under Israeli control, including Judea and Samaria." According to the bill, "It is forbidden to initiate a boycott against the State of Israel, to encourage participation in it or to provide assistance or information in order to promote it."
There is no problem, therefore, with a boycott by ultra-Orthodox consumers against supermarkets that open on Shabbat, or against a merchant whose sons serve in the Israel Defense Forces, even if it leads to their economic collapse. There might also not be a problem in boycotting fur exporters, for example. The only offense is "a boycott against the State of Israel," and in effect against the settlements, whose products are the object of most boycotts in Israel and the world over.
On Tuesday, a Knesset committee is due to approve on second and third readings the bill combating boycotts against Israel - another hysterical proposal by the right wing and Kadima MK Dalia Itzik designed to protect our weak and tiny country, which is being attacked from within and without.
"This law," explain the architects of the proposal, "is designed to protect the State of Israel in general and its citizens in particular from academic, economic and other boycotts that are imposed on the country, its citizens and corporations, due to their connection to the State of Israel." The law is designed to protect "the area under Israeli control, including Judea and Samaria." According to the bill, "It is forbidden to initiate a boycott against the State of Israel, to encourage participation in it or to provide assistance or information in order to promote it."
There is no problem, therefore, with a boycott by ultra-Orthodox consumers against supermarkets that open on Shabbat, or against a merchant whose sons serve in the Israel Defense Forces, even if it leads to their economic collapse. There might also not be a problem in boycotting fur exporters, for example. The only offense is "a boycott against the State of Israel," and in effect against the settlements, whose products are the object of most boycotts in Israel and the world over.
Israel could learn from the Egyptian syndrome :Sefy Hendler
لماذا لا يتعلم المواطن الاسرائيلي من الظاهرة المصرية؟
Israelis should make their voices heard more often in the town square. Apparently the fact that no one stops them from doing so makes this act less heroic and much more boring.
FLORENCE, Italy - The Egyptian uprising that led to Hosni Mubarak's dramatic resignation has aroused envy around the world. Not just people in dictatorships like Syria, Jordan, Sudan or Yemen are wondering when, if ever, the Egyptian scenario will reach their countries. Citizens of wealthy democracies look with longing at the demonstrators in Cairo's Tahrir (Liberation ) Square, who until the other day had limited political rights and are now responsible for one of the turning points in Middle East history.
Before Mubarak resigned, the Italian author Umberto Eco compared the situations in Rome and Cairo. He recalled the embarrassing episode, one of many, in which the Italian prime minister intervened last year with the police on behalf of a 17-year-old of Moroccan origin known as Ruby. She had been arrested on suspicion of theft. The young woman, who spent at least one evening in Silvio Berlusconi's company, is now the star witness in a case that could lead to Berlusconi's indictment on charges of paying a minor for sex. When she was arrested last year, Berlusconi indeed called the police station in Milan and tried to get her released on the weak pretext that she was "Mubarak's niece."
When Eco stood up to address the Italian opposition, he declared: "So far we believed that Mubarak and our prime minister only had a niece in common. Now we realize that they also share a refusal to resign." No more. Mubarak went. Berlusconi is still there.
The opposition in Italy has almost despaired of legally deposing Berlusconi. They see how in Egypt, light years from a model of Western democracy, the street managed to shake up the government much more efficiently. In an extraordinary situation like the Italian one, the longing for a struggle like the Egyptian one is understandable.
After all, in Italy, democracy is facing a challenge unique in the Western world. The richest man in the country, who heads the executive branch of government, controls most of the media and questions the judicial branch's authority. But even in countries where the situation is less dramatic than in Italy, there is longing for the Egyptian scenario.
We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence :RICHARD BULLIET
Whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.” So said President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1961. Americans understood this warning to refer to the incestuous relations between high-ranking military officers and the arms industry.
In the Arab world’s military autocracies, the industrial side of this complex is not arms manufacturing. The officer corps reaches into every profit center in the country.
Hosni Mubarak has now stepped down. His handing over the country’s government to the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces, however, is not likely to threaten the economic ties that connect the army officer corps with the business world — ties that have been an almost continual feature of Egyptian society, and Arab society more generally, since the year 1250. Vice President Omar Suleiman may negotiate constitutional changes, but he will never agree to a restructuring of Egyptian politics that diminishes the privileges of the military.
Portrayals of the Egyptian military during the Egyptian standoff as a potential balancing force between an unyielding president and an angry street missed the underlying dynamic of rule by army officers in most Arab countries. The army rank and file live in barracks, but the officers enjoy the good life and are deeply committed to their relatives and cronies in the business community.
Yemen offers a clear example. Relatives and business partners of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the general who has been in power even longer than Mubarak, play major roles in oil exploration, petroleum services, heavy equipment, highway building, cement production, mango farming, cotton exporting, mobile phones, banking and many other enterprises. Saleh’s relatives also number four colonels and two brigadier generals, with two more generals coming from the president’s home village. All of them hold high command positions.
For Egypt, one must multiply the Yemeni example many-fold and look not just at one family, but at the top officer ranks in general.
Big business and military privilege are intimately intertwined, and businessmen who do not have the right contacts encounter many obstacles. Thus the stake of the Egyptian officer corps and its relatives and cronies in any transition to democracy is not limited to military matters.
In Iran in 1979, the colonels and generals appointed by the shah, and the business people who obsequiously served his tyranny, fled the country. But that was a true revolution. The new government seized the property of the exiles and completely overturned the economic order.
Only now is the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guards Corps creating the same sort of military-industrial collusion that has long been standard in the Arab world.
Egypt’s protesters and their well-wishers around the world hope for a soft landing, not a revolution. Some of them also hope for an open economic and political system that will encourage a new generation of entrepreneurs and elected officials to dig the country out of its mire. But the livelihood of millions of others depends on a continuation of the economic status quo. Or at least on a slow and orderly conversion to a new system.
Given the size, strength, and popularity of the Egyptian Army, it is impossible to imagine a democratic transition in which the military command structure does not play a leading role. By the same token, it is impossible to imagine an orderly transition that does not in some way accommodate the economic interests of that command structure and its business allies.
Hosni Mubarak was no Dwight Eisenhower. Instead of warning against his country’s military-industrial complex, he embodied it. The question now is whether the order he represented will still prevail under a (slightly) more democratic constitution.
We can look at Turkey as an example of how long it takes to turn an officer-dominated ship of state in a positive direction. The first free election after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s autocratic rule took place in 1950. Ten years later the army evicted those elected leaders in a coup. It staged further coups in 1971 and 1980. A more credible democracy did not arrive until the election of the AK Party in 2002, and even now there are periodic warnings of a fresh military coup.
Similarly, it may take 50 years for Egypt to overcome centuries of subservience to its army officers. But with Mubarak gone, it is the time to take the first step on that long and difficult road.
Richard Bulliet is professor of history at Columbia University and author of “Islam: The View from the Edge” and “The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization.”
In the Arab world’s military autocracies, the industrial side of this complex is not arms manufacturing. The officer corps reaches into every profit center in the country.
Hosni Mubarak has now stepped down. His handing over the country’s government to the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces, however, is not likely to threaten the economic ties that connect the army officer corps with the business world — ties that have been an almost continual feature of Egyptian society, and Arab society more generally, since the year 1250. Vice President Omar Suleiman may negotiate constitutional changes, but he will never agree to a restructuring of Egyptian politics that diminishes the privileges of the military.
Portrayals of the Egyptian military during the Egyptian standoff as a potential balancing force between an unyielding president and an angry street missed the underlying dynamic of rule by army officers in most Arab countries. The army rank and file live in barracks, but the officers enjoy the good life and are deeply committed to their relatives and cronies in the business community.
Yemen offers a clear example. Relatives and business partners of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the general who has been in power even longer than Mubarak, play major roles in oil exploration, petroleum services, heavy equipment, highway building, cement production, mango farming, cotton exporting, mobile phones, banking and many other enterprises. Saleh’s relatives also number four colonels and two brigadier generals, with two more generals coming from the president’s home village. All of them hold high command positions.
For Egypt, one must multiply the Yemeni example many-fold and look not just at one family, but at the top officer ranks in general.
Big business and military privilege are intimately intertwined, and businessmen who do not have the right contacts encounter many obstacles. Thus the stake of the Egyptian officer corps and its relatives and cronies in any transition to democracy is not limited to military matters.
In Iran in 1979, the colonels and generals appointed by the shah, and the business people who obsequiously served his tyranny, fled the country. But that was a true revolution. The new government seized the property of the exiles and completely overturned the economic order.
Only now is the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guards Corps creating the same sort of military-industrial collusion that has long been standard in the Arab world.
Egypt’s protesters and their well-wishers around the world hope for a soft landing, not a revolution. Some of them also hope for an open economic and political system that will encourage a new generation of entrepreneurs and elected officials to dig the country out of its mire. But the livelihood of millions of others depends on a continuation of the economic status quo. Or at least on a slow and orderly conversion to a new system.
Given the size, strength, and popularity of the Egyptian Army, it is impossible to imagine a democratic transition in which the military command structure does not play a leading role. By the same token, it is impossible to imagine an orderly transition that does not in some way accommodate the economic interests of that command structure and its business allies.
Hosni Mubarak was no Dwight Eisenhower. Instead of warning against his country’s military-industrial complex, he embodied it. The question now is whether the order he represented will still prevail under a (slightly) more democratic constitution.
We can look at Turkey as an example of how long it takes to turn an officer-dominated ship of state in a positive direction. The first free election after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s autocratic rule took place in 1950. Ten years later the army evicted those elected leaders in a coup. It staged further coups in 1971 and 1980. A more credible democracy did not arrive until the election of the AK Party in 2002, and even now there are periodic warnings of a fresh military coup.
Similarly, it may take 50 years for Egypt to overcome centuries of subservience to its army officers. But with Mubarak gone, it is the time to take the first step on that long and difficult road.
Richard Bulliet is professor of history at Columbia University and author of “Islam: The View from the Edge” and “The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization.”
Valentine's Day in Bahrain ثورة في يوم عيد الحب في البحرينOmar Al-Shehabi
Cyber activists in Bahrain have declared Valentine's Day a "day of wrath" in the kingdom. It is also the 10th anniversary of a referendum in which Bahrainis approved a national charter promising a new political era after decades of political unrest.
The day of wrath's Facebook page passed 10,000 supporters within a few days, and a declaration in the name of Bahraini Youth for Freedom is being widely circulated online. The authorities have already moved to counter any possible repercussions from the tumultuous events in region. The leadership held talks with President Hosni Mubarak shortly after the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia, and plans to pump in hundreds of millions of dollars in food subsidies have been announced. Many web forums and Facebook pages have been blocked, and the British embassy has issued a notice to UK citizens regarding 14 February.
With a landmass about the size of Malta and citizens barely numbering half a million, Bahrain is not usually a centre of attention in the Arab world. Its regional significance, however, outweighs its small size. A former British colony, it is only a 15-minute drive from Saudi Arabia, and Iranian claims to the island date back centuries. Its history of activism makes it one of the most politically vibrant countries in the region, with developments on the island seen as precursors to changes in other Gulf Arab states.
Thousands attend regular political rallies on issues ranging from unemployment to Palestinian solidarity, with pundits joking that Bahrain holds the world record in demonstrations per capita.
The political situation has been simmering since last summer. The authorities, shortly before parliamentary elections, began a crackdown on those it accused of being involved in a plot to overthrow the regime and planning acts of terrorism. The count of detainees has reached 300, and allegations of torture have been widespread.
Add to that a cocktail of grievances that have been aired more and more forcefully over the past decade, and observers are wondering whether Bahrain might be the first of the Arab Gulf states to see protests in the wake of Tunisia and Egypt.
The day of wrath's Facebook page passed 10,000 supporters within a few days, and a declaration in the name of Bahraini Youth for Freedom is being widely circulated online. The authorities have already moved to counter any possible repercussions from the tumultuous events in region. The leadership held talks with President Hosni Mubarak shortly after the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia, and plans to pump in hundreds of millions of dollars in food subsidies have been announced. Many web forums and Facebook pages have been blocked, and the British embassy has issued a notice to UK citizens regarding 14 February.
With a landmass about the size of Malta and citizens barely numbering half a million, Bahrain is not usually a centre of attention in the Arab world. Its regional significance, however, outweighs its small size. A former British colony, it is only a 15-minute drive from Saudi Arabia, and Iranian claims to the island date back centuries. Its history of activism makes it one of the most politically vibrant countries in the region, with developments on the island seen as precursors to changes in other Gulf Arab states.
Thousands attend regular political rallies on issues ranging from unemployment to Palestinian solidarity, with pundits joking that Bahrain holds the world record in demonstrations per capita.
The political situation has been simmering since last summer. The authorities, shortly before parliamentary elections, began a crackdown on those it accused of being involved in a plot to overthrow the regime and planning acts of terrorism. The count of detainees has reached 300, and allegations of torture have been widespread.
Add to that a cocktail of grievances that have been aired more and more forcefully over the past decade, and observers are wondering whether Bahrain might be the first of the Arab Gulf states to see protests in the wake of Tunisia and Egypt.
3.000 étudiants et avocats ont manifesté à Sanaa
3.000 étudiants et avocats ont manifesté lundi à Sanaa, réclamant la démission du président yéménite Ali Abdallah Saleh.
La manifestation, tout comme celles qui se sont tenues au cours des derniers jours, est organisée à l'initiative d'étudiants et de composantes de la société civile. L'opposition parlementaire n'y est pas associé
"Le peuple veut la chute du régime", répétaient-ils également, reprenant le principal slogan du soulèvement en Egypte.
Les protestataires se sont rassemblés devant l'Université de Sanaa et ont tenté de se diriger vers la place Tahrir (place de la Libération) mais les forces de sécurité ont installé des barbelés pour les empêcher d'accéder à cette place où des partisans du pouvoir avaient dressé des tentes la semaine dernière.
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La manifestation, tout comme celles qui se sont tenues au cours des derniers jours, est organisée à l'initiative d'étudiants et de composantes de la société civile. L'opposition parlementaire n'y est pas associé
ثلاثة آلاف متظاهر في صنعاء يطالبون برحيل علي عبد الله صالح ، توجه المتظاهرون نحو ساحة التحرير، والتي تحولت الى رمز الحرية في العالم العربي، وذلك بعد رحيل مبارك وبن علي ، من هذه الساحة بالذات
"Après Moubarak, Ali", scandaient les manifestants, comparant le président Saleh, au pouvoir depuis 32 ans, avec son homologue égyptien Hosni Moubarak, chassé du pouvoir par la rue vendredi, après 30 ans à la tête de l'Egypte."Le peuple veut la chute du régime", répétaient-ils également, reprenant le principal slogan du soulèvement en Egypte.
Les protestataires se sont rassemblés devant l'Université de Sanaa et ont tenté de se diriger vers la place Tahrir (place de la Libération) mais les forces de sécurité ont installé des barbelés pour les empêcher d'accéder à cette place où des partisans du pouvoir avaient dressé des tentes la semaine dernière.
Partager
Dernières Infos
Liban et Proche-OrientInternational
Egypte : transition de six mois
L'exode tunisien inquiète Rome
Afrique du Sud : Bono accusé d'attiser la haine raciale
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Le gouvernement de l'Autorité palestinienne démissionne
استقالة حكومة السلطة الفلسطينية
Le gouvernement de l'Autorité palestinienne démissionne
Le Premier ministre palestinien, Salam Fayyad, a présenté ce lundi la démission de son gouvernement et va nommer de nouveaux ministres à la demande du président de l'Autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas, ont annoncé des responsables.
Le remaniement était réclamé de longue date par Salam Fayyad et par certains membres du Fatah, le mouvement d'Abbas. L'Autorité palestinienne a annoncé samedi que de nouvelles élections législatives et présidentielle auraient lieu d'ici septembre.
Demonstrators raised the flag of Bahrain and demanded to investigate violations of human rights.
Demonstrators began after the morning prayer in a peaceful demonstration in Nuwaidrat ( 5:00 AM )
Demonstrators raised the flag of Bahrain and demanded to investigate violations of human rights.
Security forces fired rubber bullets and tears gas on the demonstrators ( 6:45 AM ).
Disperse the demonstrators, and after about 15 minutes they gathered again in a peaceful demonstration.
Security forces fired rubber bullets and tear gas again ( with the presence of the foreign press).
Many of the demonstrators were injured, and one demonstrators may have been moved to hospital.
Demonstrators raised the flag of Bahrain and demanded to investigate violations of human rights.
Security forces fired rubber bullets and tears gas on the demonstrators ( 6:45 AM ).
Disperse the demonstrators, and after about 15 minutes they gathered again in a peaceful demonstration.
Security forces fired rubber bullets and tear gas again ( with the presence of the foreign press).
Many of the demonstrators were injured, and one demonstrators may have been moved to hospital.
Five Questions on Jordan : Ziad Abu-Rish
difference between protesters in Tahrir Square and the average Jordanian is not in their aspirations for real meaningful change. It is in the legacies animating each society (some of which are mentioned in Question 3), the strategic calculations within these contexts, and unforeseen contingencies (like the murder of Khalid Said in Egypt or the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazzi in Tunisia) that radicalize public demands. The fact that Jordanians are not choosing revolution, openly calling for the abolition of the Monarchy, or turning out in significantly large numbers is not the same as them not wanting change that is real and meaningful. Rather, it is simply a reflection of the fact that many elements inform the actions people undertake in their quest for freedom, including a diversity of positions in between the dichotomous poles of allegiance to the Monarchy and calls for its abolition.
[Protesters outside the Egyptian Embassy in Amman. Image from Assoicated Press]
In the shadow of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, social mobilizations and political developments in Jordan have prompted a significant amount of attention on the Kingdom. Below are the five most common questions I’ve received from both friends and reporters as well as composites of my responses.
(1) Will we see in Jordan the type of upheaval we are witnessing in Tunisia or Egypt?
To date, what has happened in Jordan does not compare to what is happening in other parts of the Arab world neither in terms of degree (i.e., the number of people out in the streets) nor in terms of nature (i.e., the types of demands being made). Jordan shares many of the structural features and governing practices that have inspired the mass mobilizations in both Egypt and Tunisia. These are primarily authoritarian systems of rule that offer little in the way of accountability and civil liberties as well as a neoliberal economic development strategy that has disempowered the average citizen vis-à-vis meeting her basic needs. However, whereas demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia have been focused on regime change, protests in Jordan over the past four weeks have called for changes in the government (which is appointed by the regime) as well as serious (as opposed to cosmetic) reforms that would fundamentally address the political and economic problems facing Jordanian society. Is it possible that mobilizations in Jordan could develop, both in terms of size and demands, into what has transpired in Tunisia and Egypt? It is certainly possible but not very likely barring some major contingencies. However, it should be noted that public slogans surrounding the protests as well as the specific demands being advanced through various public letters are shifting from calls for the downfall of the government to specific political and economic reforms. Again though, these demands for reform are nowhere approaching calls for regime change.
(2) Why is it that Jordan is not experiencing similar mobilizations both in terms of size and demands?
The level of polarization between the regime and the general population in Jordan has not reached the zero-sum game it reached in Egypt and Tunisia. This is a result of several complex historical factors. An initial assessment of these factors would consider the following:
First, the nature of the Monarchy’s legitimacy in Jordan is different than that of the “republican” regimes of Egypt and Tunisia. Similar to Morocco’s Alaouite dynasty (see Gretchen Head on Morocco), the Hashemite dynasty claims descent through the Prophet Mohammad as well as the leading role in the “Arab Revolt” against the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the Jordanian state was constructed (both materially and discursively) around Hashemite sovereignty. Such legacies, however one may evaluate them, offer the Hashemites both Islamic and Arab nationalist credentials that complicate discussions about the legitimacy of King Abdullah II and the Hashemite Monarchy.
Second, there has been an effective rhetorical separation between the Monarchy (i.e., the regime) and the government (i.e., the royally-appointed Cabinet). In other words, political discourse in Jordan has represented contemporary politics (whether the government, the formal opposition, or any of the state institutions) in the Kingdom as separate from the role of the Monarchy. This is partly a function of the legitimacy of the Monarchy discussed above. It is also a function of the fact that law and violence have enforced this separation. Equally important, the Monarchy has in many ways set itself up as the vanguard of reform in the Kingdom, claiming to both plot the course of reform and manage its dangers. Barring some type of radicalization of the public, this separation and the legal violence that underpins it has had a real effect on the nature of political demands being advanced.
Third, the dynamic of top-down regime-managed political reform has offered several controlled outlets for public frustration (e.g., organized demonstrations, new media forums, parliamentary elections) while maintaining the concentration of power in both the polity and the economy. This strategy has sometimes responded to public demands (e.g., the sacking of the Cabinet of Samir al-Rifa’i) while at others has pre-empted them (e.g., calling for national consensus on a new election law). Thus, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the “reform game” is still playing itself out in Jordan with little indication of what Jadaliyya Co-Editor Hesham Sallam described as “a rebellion against orthodox Egyptian politics, which includes the ruling party and the ineffective and mostly co-opted formal opposition parties it surrounded itself with for decades.” (See statements by Jordanian Islamist, leftist, and centrist parties for their positions on reform in the Kingdom.)
Fourth, there are the socio-political legacies of intergroup relations in Jordan. For several decades, the Monarchy has played the role of mediator between rival tribes in Jordan. This has caused a broad spectrum of Trans-Jordanian tribes to maintain their loyalty to the King and his ability to “keep the peace” amongst competing tribes and factions therein. Furthermore, the Monarchy’s historical strategy of constructing a social base by privileging Jordanians of East Bank origin over those of Palestinian origin has buttressed the regime. Given that Jordanians of Palestinian origin represent a majority of the population, East Bankers would lose whatever privileges they currently have in an alternative system of rule. Finally, with a history of repressing and co-opting secular and leftist opposition figures/movements, the primarily-of-Palestinian-origin Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political wing – the Islamic Action Front (IAF) – have emerged as the leading opposition group on the Jordanian political scene. Thus, the existing alternative to the regime (i.e., an IAF-dominated government) presently poses significant problems for parties that stand to lose the most from a redistribution of power. (not to mention various segments of the Jordanian population that are weary of the IAF). This is perhaps most evident in the recent statements by a coalition of centrist parties that “only when there emerge two strong parties running for elections” would it become appropriate to enact the type of reforms that would allow for a Prime Minister (PM) and Cabinet to be selected by the Parliament – as opposed to the existing practice of a royally-appointed PM whose Cabinet is selected from outside the Parliament. These legacies combine to create formidable obstacles to the formation of broad-based mass mobilizations necessary for either revolution or genuine reform. In effect, they have created variations of what Eva Bellin (in a different yet related context) calls "contingent democrats" (i.e., supportive of democracy only given certain guarantees of what the power-distribution in that democracy would like).
Lastly, the regime has a consolidated command of all branches of the armed forces, intelligence services, and police agencies. The Jordanian regime effectively adapted to the regional series of military coups that occurred between the 1940s and 1960s to consolidate its rule and “coup proof” itself. As Hesham Sallam and Paul Amar have argued, fissures between the different coercive institutions of the state – as well as that between the army and the regime – are central dynamics that structure the strategic calculations of both formal opposition groups as well as those activists interested in contentious politics. There is little doubt that all coecive institutions of the Jordanian state would be effectively mobilized in defense of the Monarchy.
(3) What about the “domino effect” that many analysts and media outlets are alluding to?
Recent events in the region (particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, but also in Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen) have forced a shift in the public discourse of politics as well as in the strategies of regimes and opposition groups alike in all Arab states. Whether what happened in Tunisia and Egypt (both ongoing processes) will happen in other countries depends on the historical legacies specific to each state, along with both structural conditions and unforeseen contingencies. We need to be critical of the idea of a linear path-dependent domino effect. It might be more productive to consider a “demonstration effect.” Developments in Tunisia and Egypt have made it possible to imagine alternatives to the existing Arab regimes in ways that go much further than was previously the case. As Maya Mikdashi, Noura Erekat and Sherene Seikaly have poignantly captured, these developments have opened up future perspectives that these regimes have long foreclosed. This has primarily occurred in two ways. On the one hand, we have witnessed the collapse of what Bassam Haddad described as the “’eternal’ aura these regimes/leaders occupied in the conscience or un-conscience of ‘their’ people—despite, or maybe because of, their longstanding opposition.” On the other hand, neighborhood committees, Muslim-Christian solidarity, and various efforts at coalition building have challenged the false choice between authoritarianism and chaos (a choice that Arab regimes and their supporters always allude to). This new imaginative possibility could very well lead remaining regimes, their formal opposition, and those sectors of the population not co-opted by either to alter their strategic calculations. On the one hand, that might translate into real tangible gains in certain spheres of the polity and the economy. On the other hand, it might cause existing regimes to find new ways of “upgrading authoritarianism” (i.e., the reform game). Either of these outcomes depends on a regime’s self-assessment and the public’s level of radicalization and nature of mobilization. In sum, recent events have caused a transformation in both the expectations of different populations as well as the calculations of different regimes. Whether these transformations will translate into anything structural in terms of systems of rule and economic development models remains to be seen.
(4) Does the lack of larger numbers and more radical demands similar to those of Tunisia and Egypt mean that Jordanians are content with the existing political system?
It is important to parse the issues here. First, you have the question of how people feel about the King. Second, you have the issue of demands for a genuinely representative, accountable, and rights-based political system. Finally, you have the issue of what people are willing to do to create such a system.
One of the difficulties in gauging public perception of the King is that various forms of political speech, especially those concerning the Monarchy, continue to be criminalized. Thus, it is literally impossible to speak freely of the King. Feelings about the King and the Monarchy are probably much more complex than a dichotomy between unwavering loyalty and calls for its abolition offer. However, it is impossible to grasp this complexity absent the necessary conditions to protect the rights of people to freely express their position on the issue.
However, there are a plethora of specific demands for reform that have been articulated through various forums, media, and statements including those for a representative election law, an empowered parliament, genuine freedom of speech, association, and assembly, as well as reforms to various legal codes and procedures, especially those associated with “crimes against the state.” The notion that people are uninterested in civil liberties, adequate representation, and government accountability is absurd. There might be certain political elites, within the regime, government, or formal opposition that have made strategic choices about what reforms are to take place at what point. But that is different than saying that the vast majority of the population does not desire and yearn for real political reforms that safeguard their civil liberties, provide adequate representation, and offer avenues for holding officials accountable.
The difference between protesters in Tahrir Square and the average Jordanian is not in their aspirations for real meaningful change. It is in the legacies animating each society (some of which are mentioned in Question 3), the strategic calculations within these contexts, and unforeseen contingencies (like the murder of Khalid Said in Egypt or the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazzi in Tunisia) that radicalize public demands. The fact that Jordanians are not choosing revolution, openly calling for the abolition of the Monarchy, or turning out in significantly large numbers is not the same as them not wanting change that is real and meaningful. Rather, it is simply a reflection of the fact that many elements inform the actions people undertake in their quest for freedom, including a diversity of positions in between the dichotomous poles of allegiance to the Monarchy and calls for its abolition.
(5) The concessions made in the last few weeks represent more of the status quo. What would real change look like?
Over the past few weeks, the regime in Jordan has increased the subsidization of basic goods, raised the salaries/pensions of current/retired civil and military public sector employees, sacked the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, appointed a new Prime Minister, and promised to persist in the “ongoing” program and political and economic reform. None of these measures offers anything structurally different in terms of civil liberties, representation, or accountability. This is to say nothing about the economic development strategy underway in Jordan, which I will address in a future article specifically dedicated to the topic.
[Protesters outside the Egyptian Embassy in Amman. Image from Assoicated Press]
In the shadow of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, social mobilizations and political developments in Jordan have prompted a significant amount of attention on the Kingdom. Below are the five most common questions I’ve received from both friends and reporters as well as composites of my responses.
(1) Will we see in Jordan the type of upheaval we are witnessing in Tunisia or Egypt?
To date, what has happened in Jordan does not compare to what is happening in other parts of the Arab world neither in terms of degree (i.e., the number of people out in the streets) nor in terms of nature (i.e., the types of demands being made). Jordan shares many of the structural features and governing practices that have inspired the mass mobilizations in both Egypt and Tunisia. These are primarily authoritarian systems of rule that offer little in the way of accountability and civil liberties as well as a neoliberal economic development strategy that has disempowered the average citizen vis-à-vis meeting her basic needs. However, whereas demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia have been focused on regime change, protests in Jordan over the past four weeks have called for changes in the government (which is appointed by the regime) as well as serious (as opposed to cosmetic) reforms that would fundamentally address the political and economic problems facing Jordanian society. Is it possible that mobilizations in Jordan could develop, both in terms of size and demands, into what has transpired in Tunisia and Egypt? It is certainly possible but not very likely barring some major contingencies. However, it should be noted that public slogans surrounding the protests as well as the specific demands being advanced through various public letters are shifting from calls for the downfall of the government to specific political and economic reforms. Again though, these demands for reform are nowhere approaching calls for regime change.
(2) Why is it that Jordan is not experiencing similar mobilizations both in terms of size and demands?
The level of polarization between the regime and the general population in Jordan has not reached the zero-sum game it reached in Egypt and Tunisia. This is a result of several complex historical factors. An initial assessment of these factors would consider the following:
First, the nature of the Monarchy’s legitimacy in Jordan is different than that of the “republican” regimes of Egypt and Tunisia. Similar to Morocco’s Alaouite dynasty (see Gretchen Head on Morocco), the Hashemite dynasty claims descent through the Prophet Mohammad as well as the leading role in the “Arab Revolt” against the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the Jordanian state was constructed (both materially and discursively) around Hashemite sovereignty. Such legacies, however one may evaluate them, offer the Hashemites both Islamic and Arab nationalist credentials that complicate discussions about the legitimacy of King Abdullah II and the Hashemite Monarchy.
Second, there has been an effective rhetorical separation between the Monarchy (i.e., the regime) and the government (i.e., the royally-appointed Cabinet). In other words, political discourse in Jordan has represented contemporary politics (whether the government, the formal opposition, or any of the state institutions) in the Kingdom as separate from the role of the Monarchy. This is partly a function of the legitimacy of the Monarchy discussed above. It is also a function of the fact that law and violence have enforced this separation. Equally important, the Monarchy has in many ways set itself up as the vanguard of reform in the Kingdom, claiming to both plot the course of reform and manage its dangers. Barring some type of radicalization of the public, this separation and the legal violence that underpins it has had a real effect on the nature of political demands being advanced.
Third, the dynamic of top-down regime-managed political reform has offered several controlled outlets for public frustration (e.g., organized demonstrations, new media forums, parliamentary elections) while maintaining the concentration of power in both the polity and the economy. This strategy has sometimes responded to public demands (e.g., the sacking of the Cabinet of Samir al-Rifa’i) while at others has pre-empted them (e.g., calling for national consensus on a new election law). Thus, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the “reform game” is still playing itself out in Jordan with little indication of what Jadaliyya Co-Editor Hesham Sallam described as “a rebellion against orthodox Egyptian politics, which includes the ruling party and the ineffective and mostly co-opted formal opposition parties it surrounded itself with for decades.” (See statements by Jordanian Islamist, leftist, and centrist parties for their positions on reform in the Kingdom.)
Fourth, there are the socio-political legacies of intergroup relations in Jordan. For several decades, the Monarchy has played the role of mediator between rival tribes in Jordan. This has caused a broad spectrum of Trans-Jordanian tribes to maintain their loyalty to the King and his ability to “keep the peace” amongst competing tribes and factions therein. Furthermore, the Monarchy’s historical strategy of constructing a social base by privileging Jordanians of East Bank origin over those of Palestinian origin has buttressed the regime. Given that Jordanians of Palestinian origin represent a majority of the population, East Bankers would lose whatever privileges they currently have in an alternative system of rule. Finally, with a history of repressing and co-opting secular and leftist opposition figures/movements, the primarily-of-Palestinian-origin Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political wing – the Islamic Action Front (IAF) – have emerged as the leading opposition group on the Jordanian political scene. Thus, the existing alternative to the regime (i.e., an IAF-dominated government) presently poses significant problems for parties that stand to lose the most from a redistribution of power. (not to mention various segments of the Jordanian population that are weary of the IAF). This is perhaps most evident in the recent statements by a coalition of centrist parties that “only when there emerge two strong parties running for elections” would it become appropriate to enact the type of reforms that would allow for a Prime Minister (PM) and Cabinet to be selected by the Parliament – as opposed to the existing practice of a royally-appointed PM whose Cabinet is selected from outside the Parliament. These legacies combine to create formidable obstacles to the formation of broad-based mass mobilizations necessary for either revolution or genuine reform. In effect, they have created variations of what Eva Bellin (in a different yet related context) calls "contingent democrats" (i.e., supportive of democracy only given certain guarantees of what the power-distribution in that democracy would like).
Lastly, the regime has a consolidated command of all branches of the armed forces, intelligence services, and police agencies. The Jordanian regime effectively adapted to the regional series of military coups that occurred between the 1940s and 1960s to consolidate its rule and “coup proof” itself. As Hesham Sallam and Paul Amar have argued, fissures between the different coercive institutions of the state – as well as that between the army and the regime – are central dynamics that structure the strategic calculations of both formal opposition groups as well as those activists interested in contentious politics. There is little doubt that all coecive institutions of the Jordanian state would be effectively mobilized in defense of the Monarchy.
(3) What about the “domino effect” that many analysts and media outlets are alluding to?
Recent events in the region (particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, but also in Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen) have forced a shift in the public discourse of politics as well as in the strategies of regimes and opposition groups alike in all Arab states. Whether what happened in Tunisia and Egypt (both ongoing processes) will happen in other countries depends on the historical legacies specific to each state, along with both structural conditions and unforeseen contingencies. We need to be critical of the idea of a linear path-dependent domino effect. It might be more productive to consider a “demonstration effect.” Developments in Tunisia and Egypt have made it possible to imagine alternatives to the existing Arab regimes in ways that go much further than was previously the case. As Maya Mikdashi, Noura Erekat and Sherene Seikaly have poignantly captured, these developments have opened up future perspectives that these regimes have long foreclosed. This has primarily occurred in two ways. On the one hand, we have witnessed the collapse of what Bassam Haddad described as the “’eternal’ aura these regimes/leaders occupied in the conscience or un-conscience of ‘their’ people—despite, or maybe because of, their longstanding opposition.” On the other hand, neighborhood committees, Muslim-Christian solidarity, and various efforts at coalition building have challenged the false choice between authoritarianism and chaos (a choice that Arab regimes and their supporters always allude to). This new imaginative possibility could very well lead remaining regimes, their formal opposition, and those sectors of the population not co-opted by either to alter their strategic calculations. On the one hand, that might translate into real tangible gains in certain spheres of the polity and the economy. On the other hand, it might cause existing regimes to find new ways of “upgrading authoritarianism” (i.e., the reform game). Either of these outcomes depends on a regime’s self-assessment and the public’s level of radicalization and nature of mobilization. In sum, recent events have caused a transformation in both the expectations of different populations as well as the calculations of different regimes. Whether these transformations will translate into anything structural in terms of systems of rule and economic development models remains to be seen.
(4) Does the lack of larger numbers and more radical demands similar to those of Tunisia and Egypt mean that Jordanians are content with the existing political system?
It is important to parse the issues here. First, you have the question of how people feel about the King. Second, you have the issue of demands for a genuinely representative, accountable, and rights-based political system. Finally, you have the issue of what people are willing to do to create such a system.
One of the difficulties in gauging public perception of the King is that various forms of political speech, especially those concerning the Monarchy, continue to be criminalized. Thus, it is literally impossible to speak freely of the King. Feelings about the King and the Monarchy are probably much more complex than a dichotomy between unwavering loyalty and calls for its abolition offer. However, it is impossible to grasp this complexity absent the necessary conditions to protect the rights of people to freely express their position on the issue.
However, there are a plethora of specific demands for reform that have been articulated through various forums, media, and statements including those for a representative election law, an empowered parliament, genuine freedom of speech, association, and assembly, as well as reforms to various legal codes and procedures, especially those associated with “crimes against the state.” The notion that people are uninterested in civil liberties, adequate representation, and government accountability is absurd. There might be certain political elites, within the regime, government, or formal opposition that have made strategic choices about what reforms are to take place at what point. But that is different than saying that the vast majority of the population does not desire and yearn for real political reforms that safeguard their civil liberties, provide adequate representation, and offer avenues for holding officials accountable.
The difference between protesters in Tahrir Square and the average Jordanian is not in their aspirations for real meaningful change. It is in the legacies animating each society (some of which are mentioned in Question 3), the strategic calculations within these contexts, and unforeseen contingencies (like the murder of Khalid Said in Egypt or the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazzi in Tunisia) that radicalize public demands. The fact that Jordanians are not choosing revolution, openly calling for the abolition of the Monarchy, or turning out in significantly large numbers is not the same as them not wanting change that is real and meaningful. Rather, it is simply a reflection of the fact that many elements inform the actions people undertake in their quest for freedom, including a diversity of positions in between the dichotomous poles of allegiance to the Monarchy and calls for its abolition.
(5) The concessions made in the last few weeks represent more of the status quo. What would real change look like?
Over the past few weeks, the regime in Jordan has increased the subsidization of basic goods, raised the salaries/pensions of current/retired civil and military public sector employees, sacked the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, appointed a new Prime Minister, and promised to persist in the “ongoing” program and political and economic reform. None of these measures offers anything structurally different in terms of civil liberties, representation, or accountability. This is to say nothing about the economic development strategy underway in Jordan, which I will address in a future article specifically dedicated to the topic.
Mubarak's Final Hours: Desperate Bids To Stay:Cairo Al Akhbar
According to Cairo Al Akhbar, when the US and others started broadcasting during the day that he would announce resignation, he (or apparently Jamal) changed the speech from one that originally announced his resignation to one that said he wouldnt accept external dictates and that he was staying until September. Other reports say he fainted and couldnt record the speech thats why it was cut. In those last days they must have been propping him up literally.
Hosni Mubarak was supposed to announce his resignation on Thursday. The Egyptian military expected it. The new head of his ruling party pleaded to him face-to-face to do it. But despite more than two weeks of massive demonstrations by protesters unmoved by lesser concessions, the president still didn't get it.
Mubarak's top aides and family — including his son Gamal, widely viewed as his intended successor — told him he could still ride out the turmoil. So the televised resignation speech the rest of Egypt had expected became a stubborn — and ultimately humiliating — effort to cling to power. It only enraged protesters. On Friday, the military moved decisively.
On Saturday, insiders in Egypt gave The Associated Press an initial picture of what happened in the hours before Egypt's "unoustable" leader of nearly 30 years fell. Some of them spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information.
Their account portrayed Mubarak as unable, or unwilling, to grasp that nothing less than his immediate departure would save the country from the chaos generated by the protests that began Jan. 25. A senior government official said Mubarak lacked the political machinery that could give him sound advice about what was happening in the country.
"He did not look beyond what Gamal was telling him, so he was isolated politically," said the official. "Every incremental move (by Mubarak) was too little too late."
The military, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of Mubarak and Omar Suleiman, his newly appointed vice president, to end the protests. The unrest spiraled out of control Thursday and Friday, with demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins and even gunbattles engulfing almost the entire nation.
Insiders spoke of fighting among Cabinet ministers over how great a threat the demonstrators posed, and of deliberate attempts by close aides, including Gamal Mubarak, to conceal from the president the full extent of what was happening on the streets.
The insiders who spoke to the AP include a senior Egyptian official, editors and journalists from state newspapers close to the regime who have spent years covering Mubarak's presidency, retired army generals in contact with top active duty officers, senior members of Mubarak's National Democratic Party and analysts familiar with the machinations of Mubarak's inner circle.
Their account of the events of the past three weeks shows that the military became concerned soon after the protests began. They said it was the military that persuaded Mubarak to appoint Suleiman as vice president — the first since Mubarak took office in 1981 — and place him in charge of negotiations with opposition groups on a way out of the standoff.
Suleiman failed on that score — on Tuesday he was reduced to threatening that a coup would replace the negotiations if no progress was made. Leaders of the protests vowed not to negotiate until Mubarak was gone, even after he said he would not seek another term in September and promised reforms to reduce poverty, end repressive emergency laws and make Egypt more democratic.
By Thursday, nearly everyone had expected Mubarak to resign, including the military.
Hossam Badrawi, a stalwart of Mubarak's National Democratic Party, met with Mubarak on Thursday and later told reporters that he expected the Egyptian leader to "meet people's demands" — read that stepping down — later the same day. After Mubarak did not, Badrawi, who had been named the party's secretary general a few days earlier, resigned in protest, according to two party insiders.
Meanwhile, the military's highest executive body — The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces — met without its chairman, commander-in-chief Mubarak, and issued a statement recognizing the "legitimate" rights of the protesters. They called the statement "Communique No. 1," language that in the Arab world suggests a a coup was taking place.
Insiders said Mubarak's address Thursday night was meant to be his resignation announcement. Instead, he made one last desperate attempt to stay in office after being encouraged to do so by close aides and especially by his family, long the subject of rumors of corruption, abuse of power and extensive wealth.
One insider said Gamal, his banker-turned-politician son, rewrote the speech several times before the recording. It was aired at 11 p.m., several hours after state TV said Mubarak was about to address the nation. It showed brief footage of him meeting with Suleiman and his Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq.
The address was clearly prepared in a rush. It had rough cuts, and Mubarak was caught at least once acting like he was between takes, fixing his tie and looking away from the camera.
Information Minister Anas al-Fiqqi was there at the studio alongside Gamal Mubarak, according to two of the insiders. State TV quoted him in the hours before the broadcast saying that Mubarak would not resign. On Saturday, al-Fiqqi announced his own resignation.
Mubarak said in the address that he was handing over most of his powers to Suleiman but again rejected calls for his resignation. He vowed to introduce genuine reforms, prosecute those behind the violence that left scores of protesters dead and offered his condolences to the victims' families. He said he was hurting over calls for his removal and, in his defense, recounted his record in public service. He was not going anywhere until his term ended in September, he said.
He had hoped that putting Suleiman in charge would end the protests and allow him to remain in office as a symbolic figure, a scenario that would have seen him make a dignified exit.
The address betrayed what many Egyptians suspected for years — Mubarak was out of touch with the people.
Mubarak, said a senior Egyptian official, "tried to manage the crisis within the existing structures and norms. That was clearly too late. The incremental offers of reform also were clearly insufficient."
The insiders differ on whether Mubarak's address that night was made with the consent of the military, whether it represented his last chance to take back control of the streets. Even if the military's patience wasn't exhausted by the speech, it ran out as the protests grew more intense.
On Friday, the military allowed protesters to gather outside Mubarak's presidential palace in a Cairo suburb — but by that time Mubarak and his immediate family had already flown to another palace in the Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, 250 miles away. The soldiers also allowed protesters to besiege the TV and radio building in downtown Cairo. Two days earlier, the military stood by and watched as protesters laid siege to the prime minister's office and parliament. Shafiq, the prime minister, could not work in his office and had to work out of the Civil Aviation Ministry close to Cairo's airport.
By early afternoon, millions were out on the streets in Cairo, the Mediterranean port city of Alexandria and a string of other major cities. The crowd outside his palace was rapidly growing. Only a few meters and four army tanks separated the protesters from the gate.
Suleiman, Mubarak's longtime confidant and a former intelligence chief, announced that Mubarak was stepping down. In a two-sentence statement to state television that took 49 seconds, Egypt's history changed forever.
Hosni Mubarak was supposed to announce his resignation on Thursday. The Egyptian military expected it. The new head of his ruling party pleaded to him face-to-face to do it. But despite more than two weeks of massive demonstrations by protesters unmoved by lesser concessions, the president still didn't get it.
Mubarak's top aides and family — including his son Gamal, widely viewed as his intended successor — told him he could still ride out the turmoil. So the televised resignation speech the rest of Egypt had expected became a stubborn — and ultimately humiliating — effort to cling to power. It only enraged protesters. On Friday, the military moved decisively.
On Saturday, insiders in Egypt gave The Associated Press an initial picture of what happened in the hours before Egypt's "unoustable" leader of nearly 30 years fell. Some of them spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information.
Their account portrayed Mubarak as unable, or unwilling, to grasp that nothing less than his immediate departure would save the country from the chaos generated by the protests that began Jan. 25. A senior government official said Mubarak lacked the political machinery that could give him sound advice about what was happening in the country.
"He did not look beyond what Gamal was telling him, so he was isolated politically," said the official. "Every incremental move (by Mubarak) was too little too late."
The military, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of Mubarak and Omar Suleiman, his newly appointed vice president, to end the protests. The unrest spiraled out of control Thursday and Friday, with demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins and even gunbattles engulfing almost the entire nation.
Insiders spoke of fighting among Cabinet ministers over how great a threat the demonstrators posed, and of deliberate attempts by close aides, including Gamal Mubarak, to conceal from the president the full extent of what was happening on the streets.
The insiders who spoke to the AP include a senior Egyptian official, editors and journalists from state newspapers close to the regime who have spent years covering Mubarak's presidency, retired army generals in contact with top active duty officers, senior members of Mubarak's National Democratic Party and analysts familiar with the machinations of Mubarak's inner circle.
Their account of the events of the past three weeks shows that the military became concerned soon after the protests began. They said it was the military that persuaded Mubarak to appoint Suleiman as vice president — the first since Mubarak took office in 1981 — and place him in charge of negotiations with opposition groups on a way out of the standoff.
Suleiman failed on that score — on Tuesday he was reduced to threatening that a coup would replace the negotiations if no progress was made. Leaders of the protests vowed not to negotiate until Mubarak was gone, even after he said he would not seek another term in September and promised reforms to reduce poverty, end repressive emergency laws and make Egypt more democratic.
By Thursday, nearly everyone had expected Mubarak to resign, including the military.
Hossam Badrawi, a stalwart of Mubarak's National Democratic Party, met with Mubarak on Thursday and later told reporters that he expected the Egyptian leader to "meet people's demands" — read that stepping down — later the same day. After Mubarak did not, Badrawi, who had been named the party's secretary general a few days earlier, resigned in protest, according to two party insiders.
Meanwhile, the military's highest executive body — The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces — met without its chairman, commander-in-chief Mubarak, and issued a statement recognizing the "legitimate" rights of the protesters. They called the statement "Communique No. 1," language that in the Arab world suggests a a coup was taking place.
Insiders said Mubarak's address Thursday night was meant to be his resignation announcement. Instead, he made one last desperate attempt to stay in office after being encouraged to do so by close aides and especially by his family, long the subject of rumors of corruption, abuse of power and extensive wealth.
One insider said Gamal, his banker-turned-politician son, rewrote the speech several times before the recording. It was aired at 11 p.m., several hours after state TV said Mubarak was about to address the nation. It showed brief footage of him meeting with Suleiman and his Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq.
The address was clearly prepared in a rush. It had rough cuts, and Mubarak was caught at least once acting like he was between takes, fixing his tie and looking away from the camera.
Information Minister Anas al-Fiqqi was there at the studio alongside Gamal Mubarak, according to two of the insiders. State TV quoted him in the hours before the broadcast saying that Mubarak would not resign. On Saturday, al-Fiqqi announced his own resignation.
Mubarak said in the address that he was handing over most of his powers to Suleiman but again rejected calls for his resignation. He vowed to introduce genuine reforms, prosecute those behind the violence that left scores of protesters dead and offered his condolences to the victims' families. He said he was hurting over calls for his removal and, in his defense, recounted his record in public service. He was not going anywhere until his term ended in September, he said.
He had hoped that putting Suleiman in charge would end the protests and allow him to remain in office as a symbolic figure, a scenario that would have seen him make a dignified exit.
The address betrayed what many Egyptians suspected for years — Mubarak was out of touch with the people.
Mubarak, said a senior Egyptian official, "tried to manage the crisis within the existing structures and norms. That was clearly too late. The incremental offers of reform also were clearly insufficient."
The insiders differ on whether Mubarak's address that night was made with the consent of the military, whether it represented his last chance to take back control of the streets. Even if the military's patience wasn't exhausted by the speech, it ran out as the protests grew more intense.
On Friday, the military allowed protesters to gather outside Mubarak's presidential palace in a Cairo suburb — but by that time Mubarak and his immediate family had already flown to another palace in the Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, 250 miles away. The soldiers also allowed protesters to besiege the TV and radio building in downtown Cairo. Two days earlier, the military stood by and watched as protesters laid siege to the prime minister's office and parliament. Shafiq, the prime minister, could not work in his office and had to work out of the Civil Aviation Ministry close to Cairo's airport.
By early afternoon, millions were out on the streets in Cairo, the Mediterranean port city of Alexandria and a string of other major cities. The crowd outside his palace was rapidly growing. Only a few meters and four army tanks separated the protesters from the gate.
Suleiman, Mubarak's longtime confidant and a former intelligence chief, announced that Mubarak was stepping down. In a two-sentence statement to state television that took 49 seconds, Egypt's history changed forever.
Salafi movement may reassert its old position with the backing of the regime : Hossam Tammam
Even though many Western and Israeli freedomphobes have warned about a looming threat from Islamic extremists in Egypt, they overlook the fact that Egypt’s ultra-conservative Salafi Muslims were in the “pro-stability” camp, unwilling to challenge the Mubarak regime.
Salafis unanimously boycotted the revolution, claiming it was sedition. They accepted decades of injustice, but rejected the revolution. The revolution revealed an unintended alliance between the Mubarak regime and the Salafi movement. On the one hand, this movement is backed by elements in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, its members are periodically subjected to harassment by the regime. However, the regime does not see this as completely eliminating its alliance with the movement, as long as the movement continues to support the regime politically.
One of the paradoxes of the Egyptian revolution is that a regime that had just recently banned Salafi TV channels and accused them of inciting sectarian conflict reversed its position and employed Salafi sheikhs in its war against the revolution. This time, Salafi sheikhs and figures, such as Mohammed Hassan, Mahmoud Al-Masri, Mostafa al-Adawi, appeared on state television and private channels close to the regime. They called for an end to protests, using arguments about security and the dangers of sedition. Some went as far as questioning the patriotism of those who instigated the revolution, arguing that it was an American-Zionist conspiracy or akin to the Iranian revolution. The manipulative statements of Iranian leaders in support of the Egyptian uprising further contributed to the Salafi counterattack.
The position of Salafis toward the Egyptian revolution comes as no surprise, especially as they have a history of supporting the regime. The famous Salafi edict to kill prominent reform advocate Mohammed ElBaradei is proof. The same sheikh issued an edict banning nominations against President Mubarak in the 2005 presidential elections on grounds that Mubarak was the commander of the faithful. What’s surprising, however, is the position of Salafis in Alexandria. This school is among the most independent from the regime and has sometimes even opposed it. Its members have been subjected to tight security measures and arrest campaigns. These campaigns peaked following the attack on the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on New Year ’s Eve. Hundreds of Salafis were arrested and one died as a result of torture. Despite this, the Salafs in Alexandria (and across various other governorates) opposed the revolution, going as far as closing down some mosques on the “Friday of Departure.” They stoked fears about the threat other political currents–a possible reference to ElBaradei’s National Association for Change–posed to the Islamic identity.
Salafis are the strongest source of religious support–direct and indirect–for the regime at the moment. But this means the future of the Salafi movement is on the line. On the one hand, the revolution’s triumph over the Salafi movement might lead Salafis to revise their positions. On the other hand, if the revolution is unable to achieve its democratic aspirations, the Salafi movement may reassert its old position with the backing of the regime.
Salafis unanimously boycotted the revolution, claiming it was sedition. They accepted decades of injustice, but rejected the revolution. The revolution revealed an unintended alliance between the Mubarak regime and the Salafi movement. On the one hand, this movement is backed by elements in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, its members are periodically subjected to harassment by the regime. However, the regime does not see this as completely eliminating its alliance with the movement, as long as the movement continues to support the regime politically.
One of the paradoxes of the Egyptian revolution is that a regime that had just recently banned Salafi TV channels and accused them of inciting sectarian conflict reversed its position and employed Salafi sheikhs in its war against the revolution. This time, Salafi sheikhs and figures, such as Mohammed Hassan, Mahmoud Al-Masri, Mostafa al-Adawi, appeared on state television and private channels close to the regime. They called for an end to protests, using arguments about security and the dangers of sedition. Some went as far as questioning the patriotism of those who instigated the revolution, arguing that it was an American-Zionist conspiracy or akin to the Iranian revolution. The manipulative statements of Iranian leaders in support of the Egyptian uprising further contributed to the Salafi counterattack.
The position of Salafis toward the Egyptian revolution comes as no surprise, especially as they have a history of supporting the regime. The famous Salafi edict to kill prominent reform advocate Mohammed ElBaradei is proof. The same sheikh issued an edict banning nominations against President Mubarak in the 2005 presidential elections on grounds that Mubarak was the commander of the faithful. What’s surprising, however, is the position of Salafis in Alexandria. This school is among the most independent from the regime and has sometimes even opposed it. Its members have been subjected to tight security measures and arrest campaigns. These campaigns peaked following the attack on the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on New Year ’s Eve. Hundreds of Salafis were arrested and one died as a result of torture. Despite this, the Salafs in Alexandria (and across various other governorates) opposed the revolution, going as far as closing down some mosques on the “Friday of Departure.” They stoked fears about the threat other political currents–a possible reference to ElBaradei’s National Association for Change–posed to the Islamic identity.
Salafis are the strongest source of religious support–direct and indirect–for the regime at the moment. But this means the future of the Salafi movement is on the line. On the one hand, the revolution’s triumph over the Salafi movement might lead Salafis to revise their positions. On the other hand, if the revolution is unable to achieve its democratic aspirations, the Salafi movement may reassert its old position with the backing of the regime.
50,000 street children were abused byMobarak regime:Robert Fisk
عندما سقطت مريم برصاص قناص وقف على سطح مسجد السيدة زينب
The cops shot 16-year-old Mariam in the back on 28 January, a live round fired from the roof of the Saida Zeinab police station in the slums of Cairo's old city at the height of the government violence aimed at quelling the revolution, a pot shot of contempt by Mubarak's forces for the homeless street children of Egypt.
She had gone to the police with up to a hundred other beggar boys and girls to demand the release of her friend, 16-year-old Ismail Yassin, who had already been dragged inside the station. Some of the kids outside were only nine years old. Maybe that's why the first policeman on the roof fired warning bullets into the air.
Then he shot Mariam. She was taking pictures of the police on her mobile phone, but fell to the ground with a bullet in her back. The other children carried her to the nearby Mounira hospital – where the staff apparently refused to admit her – and then to the Ahmed Maher hospital, where the bullet was removed. Ismail was freed and made his way to Tahrir Square, where the pro-democracy protesters were under attack by armed men. He was wandering up Khairat Street – drawn towards violence like all the homeless of Cairo – when an unknown gunmen shot him in the head and killed him.
The cops shot 16-year-old Mariam in the back on 28 January, a live round fired from the roof of the Saida Zeinab police station in the slums of Cairo's old city at the height of the government violence aimed at quelling the revolution, a pot shot of contempt by Mubarak's forces for the homeless street children of Egypt.
She had gone to the police with up to a hundred other beggar boys and girls to demand the release of her friend, 16-year-old Ismail Yassin, who had already been dragged inside the station. Some of the kids outside were only nine years old. Maybe that's why the first policeman on the roof fired warning bullets into the air.
Then he shot Mariam. She was taking pictures of the police on her mobile phone, but fell to the ground with a bullet in her back. The other children carried her to the nearby Mounira hospital – where the staff apparently refused to admit her – and then to the Ahmed Maher hospital, where the bullet was removed. Ismail was freed and made his way to Tahrir Square, where the pro-democracy protesters were under attack by armed men. He was wandering up Khairat Street – drawn towards violence like all the homeless of Cairo – when an unknown gunmen shot him in the head and killed him.
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