تحليل من امريكا العزيزة
Tunisia’s President Zine al-Abadine Ben Ali fled Tunis for Saudi Arabia, bringing to an end 23 years of repressive, authoritarian leadership. He leaves behind a scene delicately poised between democratic change and chaos. An interim government, led by Prime Minister Muhammad Ghannouchi, faces an uncertain future. The “jasmine revolution,” as it is already being called, raises questions about the future stability of troubled regimes across the Arab world. But the events in Tunisia already have important implications for the region, and may force a change in the way we see the Middle East—and the Mediterranean.
First, the Tunisian revolution was surprising for what it was not: it was neither slow, nor Islamist (yet). The fall of the Ben Ali regime was rapid. The agents of change were largely but not exclusively young and secular. Political Islam does not seem to have played a significant role, despite the reservoir of Islamist opposition in Tunisia. Of all the North African states, Tunisia was the most obviously middle class and Mediterranean in outlook. The Tunisian experience reinforces the historic truth that revolutions are usually made by the young, the educated, and the middle class, often under conditions of rapid economic change. The next weeks and months will see an important test of how Islamist movements in Tunisia and elsewhere act in the face of a new political opening. It is worth remembering that the Iranian revolution started as a secular uprising and only later acquired a religious dimension. But Tunisia, with its relatively moderate and cohesive society, is not Iran, and the secular character of the revolution is likely to hold.
Second, events in Tunisia make clear that the prevailing political order cannot be taken for granted anywhere in the Middle East and North Africa. Still, Tunisia may be the exception rather than the model. The situation in Algeria is, in fact, more explosive. There, a decade of political violence has been followed by a decade of doubtful stability and barely hidden unrest. Despite enormous hydrocarbon wealth, and a history of international activism, Algeria has failed to reform in any meaningful way. Like Tunisia, Algeria has been unable to offer a viable future to masses of unemployed or underemployed young people. Unlike Tunisia, the sheer scale of the problem in Algeria is much larger, Islamism is the leading force of opposition, and the political culture is more intolerant and violent. A new revolt in Algeria, should it come, holds the potential for another protracted and bloody conflict between extremists and a military-backed state.
With its eccentric and enigmatic leadership, Libya is in a class of its own. But here, too, the prospects for relatively nonviolent, democratic change are not good. The outlook is quite different in reform-minded Morocco, even if many of the demographic and social challenges are similar to those felt elsewhere. Yet even a stable Morocco would be affected by a return to turmoil in Algeria. Across the region, it is notable that the recurrent spark for revolt in recent months has been food insecurity – a key concern in a world of rising commodity prices, pressure on subsidies, and popular anger at perceived economic mismanagement and corruption. This is an issue to watch.
Finally, developments in Tunisia and elsewhere in North Africa may compel American policymakers to adjust their mental maps. Tunisia is at once a Mediterranean, an Arab, and a Middle Eastern crisis. Despite over 200 years of presence, Washington has never had a strong sense of the Mediterranean as a place meriting strategic attention in its own right. This may need to change. Europe has an obvious stake in the future of the southern Mediterranean, not least because of the large North African communities in France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere, and the direct links to European security. As in the Balkans in the 1990s, an effective response sometimes requires a new geographic frame. If the last decade underscored the importance of the Gulf to the future of the Middle East, the next decade may be just as much about the Mediterranean as a place that matters. Strategy toward the Mediterranean—Europe’s near abroad—is likely to be an increasingly important test of European Union foreign policy and transatlantic cooperation.
